The Coordination Conundrum by Hardee, Catherine A.
California Western School of Law 
CWSL Scholarly Commons 
Faculty Scholarship 
2012 
The Coordination Conundrum 
Catherine A. Hardee 
California Western School of Law, chardee@cwsl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/fs 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Catherine A. Hardee, Coordination Conundrum, 49 Willamette L.Rev. 189 (2012). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CWSL Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of CWSL Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact alm@cwsl.edu. 
THE COORDINATION CONUNDRUM
CATHERINE A. HARDEE*
Reviewing speech regulations under fairly strict categoncal
rules keeps the starch in the standards for those moments when
the daily politics cries loudest for limiting what may be said.
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INTRODUCTION
Justice Souter's oft-repeated quote aptly summarizes the
function of strict standards of review in constitutional jurisprudence-
to protect unpopular speech from restrictions based on content-laden
value judgments. While strict standards have their advantages,
commentators have found fault with their rigidity and have
questioned whether any decision-making process can, or should, be
free of pragmatic considerations. This doctrinal discussion has been
reinvigorated by two recent United States Supreme Court opinions.
At the root of both cases was the Court's reliance on the distinction
between coordinated and independent speech. This Article examines
the validity of this divide and challenges the foundation upon which
the coordinated and independent dichotomy rests. This Article argues
that the Court has introduced a new standard, used in both cases-a
coordination standard-that conflates the government's interest in
restricting speech with the nature of the speech at issue. This leads to
a largely outcome-determinative standard that is not content neutral,
and is a cardinal departure from settled First Amendment law. This
Article tests its hypothesis by applying the contradicting uses of
coordination found in the two cases to a hypothetical test case-
restrictions on private aid to impoverished foreign nations in
furtherance of a new development model-and proposes a framework
for future analysis of First Amendment issues which avoids the
pitfalls revealed by the coordination divide.
In Citizens United, the Court applied strict scrutiny to speaker-
and content-based restrictions on corporate electioneering
communications and struck down those restrictions-proclaiming that
corporations have free speech rights co-extensive with those of
individual speakers.2 Essential to the Court's decision was the divide
between independent and coordinated speech, with the value of
independent speech placed above that of speech coordinated with a
candidate and therefore subject to the strictest review. Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project (HLP)3 addressed coordinated speech in
the context of national security and the war on terror. At issue was
whether Congress could bar citizens from providing "training," or
"expert advice or assistance" in coordination with foreign
organizations designated as terrorist organizations, even if that advice
2. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
3. 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
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entailed teaching non-violent conflict resolution strategies.4  Crucial
to the Court's decision was the idea that the plaintiffs' speech was
"coordinated," and thus deserving of less protection than
"independent" speech.5 Despite the fact that the restriction was
content-based, the Court applied a less stringent standard of review to
reach the conclusion that the government has a compelling interest in
restricting plaintiffs' speech.
Scholars have discussed the importance of the categorization of
speech as coordinated or independent,6 but as of yet there is no
sufficient analysis of whether "coordination" can or should have the
same meaning in both contexts. Some scholars have explained the
contradiction in the outcome of these two cases as a failure by the
Court to consistently apply strict scrutiny, others have noted the
inconsistent application of categorical rules,8 while some have
declared it a victory of pragmatism over purposivist accounts of First
Amendment protection.9 This Article will argue that, upon closer
inspection, the Court's use of independent versus coordinated speech
in both cases reveals that, despite the use of the same label and
standard of review, they are in fact different definitions of the word
"coordination." Further still, there is no doctrinal support for
importing the concept of coordination from campaign finance cases to
other contexts.
Despite the inconsistent use of coordination, this Article argues
that the Court in both cases applied a two-tiered standard of review
that values independent speech over coordinated speech. I argue that
under this standard, the subjective value of coordination is allowed to
bleed into the standard of review, creating a content-based standard
that fails to live up to the raison d'etre of standards-to "keep[] the
4. See id at 2715.
5. See id at 2726; Aziz Z. Huq, Preserving Political Speech From Ourselves and
Others, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 16, 23 (2012).
6. See Huq, supra note 5, at 23 (noting that both Citizens United and HLP "are
organized around the same boundary line between coordinated and independent speech")
(emphasis in original); Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the
Inescapable Pragmatism of the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1, 71 (2011);
Patricia Millett et al., Mixed Signals: The Roberts Court and Free Speech in the 2009 Term, 5
CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 21 (2010).
7. See Huq, supra note5, at 21-23.
8. See William D. Araiza, Citizens United, Stevens, and Humanitarian Law Project:
First Amendment Rules and Standards in Three Acts, 40 STETSON L. REV. 821, 832 (2011).
9. See Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 71-72.
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starch"10 in the courts' review when there is strong political pressure
to silence unpopular speech. When the choice of standard is largely
outcome determinative, providing courts with two standards to select
from-one with a built-in bias against certain types of speech-acts
to suppress rather than protect speech.
What makes these cases interesting, and troubling, is that the
idea of coordination was not employed to support the government's
interest in regulating speech, rather coordination was used to
determine the value of the speech at issue. This coordination standard
of review is problematic because speech coordinated with other
individuals or entities has long been protected-in fact the basis of
the right of association is the right to coordinate one's speech with
others. Clearly this lower standard of review cannot be applied to all
speech in which the speaker and audience coordinate their discussion
or it would be applicable to nearly all cases, undercutting the
application of strict scrutiny. The standard must be applied
selectively, thus giving courts the option of selecting a lower standard
of review for speech that is especially troubling, such as speech made
in conjunction with politically unpopular groups. Restricting
dissident speech because it is more likely to challenge the status quo
is clearly a content-based government interest and would normally be
rejected by the courts unless accompanied by a showing of imminent
harm from that speech.
A way to test this paper's hypothesis lies in an unlikely place-
with a possible answer to why development aid has done so little to
help the world's poorest countries. A growing body of research by
economists suggests that development aid might be part of the
problem, rather than the solution, for the world's most impoverished
nations. The research details the way in which donor money can have
a corrupting influence on local and national governance and
destabilizes markets leading to poor economic growth, both of which
increase the likelihood of conflict or a failed state that can serve as a
breeding ground for drug traffickers and terrorists. Full treatment of
these complicated issues or the myriad proposed solutions is well
beyond the scope of this Article. However, the evidence does suggest
that there would be some support for a law prohibiting private
donations made by non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
churches, foundations, other charitable organizations and individuals,
10. Denver Area Edue. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 744 (1996)
(Souter, J., concurring).
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at least to certain countries for limited periods of time.
A law restricting donations by private actors to foreign entities
provides an excellent hypothetical to test the consistency of the
Court's recent pronouncements on coordinated speech with
established First Amendment doctrine. The test regulation raises the
question of when donations are considered speech-the same
question in which the divide between coordinated and independent
speech first appeared in the campaign finance realm. It also closely
mirrors the statute at issue in HLP, including the additional
categorical justifications given by the Court for giving that speech
less strict scrutiny-a deference to the government in matters of
foreign affairs and a foreign recipient of speech-allowing for
isolation of those factors vis-A- vis the coordination question. Finally,
the two primary justifications for the hypothetical regulation-the
prevention of the corrupting influence of large amounts of money on
recipient governments and the need to prevent failing states from
becoming breeding grounds for terrorists--draw in the government's
articulated interests in both HLP and Citizens United, providing
insight into the value of each interest once one addresses the undue
emphasis placed on coordination.
Part I outlines where commentators have placed Citizens United
and HLP in the overall framework of the debate regarding how the
Roberts Court employs rigid standards in its analysis of First
Amendment claims. It concludes that the cases are more alike than
they appear at first blush, and in fact, employ two sides of the same
standard-the coordination standard. It then details the origins of the
coordination standard in campaign finance precedent with an analysis
of Buckley v. Valeo"1 and Citizens United It shows how the Court's
emphasis has subtly shifted from the differences between symbolic
speech and pure speech, to the elevation of coordination as the
defining category of speech. It then turns to the use of coordination in
HLP and provides support for the argument that the Court applied the
'less than' strict scrutiny standard borrowed from Buckley and its
progeny.
Part II argues that the opinions in Citizens United and Buckley
have ushered in a new standard of review-the coordination
standard-that, rather than protecting speech, subverts the value of
the speech analyzed to normative judgments hidden within the
standard. It further demonstrates the ways in which the coordination
I1. 424 U.S. I (1979).
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standard is a poor fit for cases outside of campaign finance, such as
HLP, and demonstrates how the standard dilutes the value of pure
speech by double-counting the government's interest in preventing
terrorism-first by denying its value as speech and again when
analyzing whether the government's interest is sufficiently tailored
under this lesser coordination standard.
Part III begins with a brief justification for a hypothetical
regulation on private donations to certain countries by outlining the
economic research showing that foreign aid can actually increase
corruption and bad governance in recipient countries, stall economic
growth and lead to an overall destabilization of recipient nations, all
of which combined raise the likelihood of a failed state with the
potential to become a breeding ground for terrorists. It then analyzes
this hypothetical regulation first under the original two-tiered
approach in Buckley and then under the coordination standard in HLP
to determine which standard best predicts results in line with existing
First Amendment doctrine. It shows that while the original Buckley
standards lead to outcomes that fit within existing First Amendment
doctrine, the coordination standard fails to create a logically
consistent framework for the evaluation of the value of speech. This
failure led to results-oriented decisions in both Citizens United and
HLP that cannot be reconciled with the stated government interests at
issue in those cases. Part III closes with the conclusion that the
coordination standard fails to assign adequate value to First
Amendment concerns, and creates a framework in which the Court
can too easily reject categorical protections put in place to cabin
judicial discretion in difficult cases when the temptation to restrict
speech is the greatest. In other words, it undercuts the protection
afforded speech precisely when that protection is needed most.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF COORDINATION
This Part locates the Court's opinions in Citizens United and
HLPwithin the ongoing discussion in the First Amendment literature
regarding the relative benefits of rigid standards or pragmatic
balancing. While, at first blush, it may seem that Citizens Unitedand
HLP represent polar opposites on the continuum between rigid
standards and ad hoc balancing, I argue in this Part that the two cases
both employ a standard-in fact, both decisions employ the same
standard, which I call the "coordination standard"-though they do so
in different ways. This Part maps how the development of the
194 [49:189
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coordination standard, which began in the campaign finance arena
with Buckley v. Valeo, dramatically changed course in Citizens
United, and then ventured into unchartered waters in HLP
A. The Value ofStandards
The value of standards,i 2 as Justice Souter famously noted, is in
their potential to exclude subjective prejudices about the content of
speech or the identity of the speaker from determinations of the value
of such speech.13  Standards do not eliminate judicial scrutiny,
however.14  Even the most rigid standards, which place the greatest
constraints on judicial discretion, still require courts to undertake
some degree of subjective analysis. When courts apply the strictest
form of scrutiny, the government may overcome that scrutiny when
its justifications for speech restrictions are sufficiently compelling and
narrowly tailored. Of course, to decide whether the government's
interest is sufficiently compelling and narrowly tailored, a court must
12. The definition of standards varies greatly in academic literature, including the idea
that "standards" encompasses the entire range of decision-making that permits any form of
judicial discretion. See Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 379, 382 n. 16
(1985) (noting definitional variety). This Article uses a different definition. For the purposes
of this Article, a standard is a practical tool courts frequently invoke to determine the baseline
for the level of protection afforded particular speech-this definition mirrors that outlined by
Geoffrey R. Stone. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-NeutriRestrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46, 50
(1987).
13. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 774 (Souter, J.,
concurring); Araiza, supra note 8, at 836 (arguing that rigid standards "provide enough of a
thumb on the judicial scale to produce predictable results that do a reasonably good job of
protecting the constitutional value at issue"); Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and
the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 474 (1985) (arguing that standards can and
should "confin[e] the range of discretion left to future decisionmakers who will be called upon
to make judgments when pathological pressures are most intense"). There are a variety of
standards ranging from strict scrutiny to rational basis review, which operate on a continuum
based on the value of speech at issue and whether the restriction on speech is content neutral.
See Stone, supra note 12, at 47-51 (exhaustively cataloging standards employed in speech
cases). The determining factors for where speech lands on this continuum are the type of
speech at issue-e.g., political speech versus commercial speech-and whether the restriction
is content based or content neutral. Id at 48. Thus, when a Court employs a standard,
arguably the most important point in its analysis is the determination of the type of speech at
issue and the nature of the restriction, which in turn dictate the proper standard of review.
14. As such, some argue that standards do not go far enough to protect constitutional
rights and that categorical rules-such as a rule that once speech is found to be political speech
it cannot be restricted-are necessary to sufficiently cabin judicial discretion. See Cass R.
Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1899, 1910 (2006) (summarizing
Justice Scalia's critique of standards that allow for balancing); Schlag, supra note 12, at 397
(describing the rules versus standards debate). This Article will not enter into the fray and
instead will focus on the gradations within the concepts of standards and ad hoc balancing.
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first undertake a subjective analysis of those interests.15 Even within
the rubric of standards, there are gradations in the way a court applies
or articulates a standard that allow the court greater or lesser freedom
to balance speech rights against the government's interests." At the
extreme, courts may reject standards entirely in favor of a case-by-
case balancing, taking into account the precise nature of the speech
and the government's interest before the court in a particular
instance.' 7
Commentators often argue, either from a descriptive or
normative perspective, about where a particular speech doctrine or
case falls on the spectrum between rigid rules and pragmatic
balancing.' 8 The literature takes particular note of the preferences of
individual Justices or courts for rigid standards or more pragmatic
case-by-case analysis.19 Two important First Amendment decisions
issued by the Supreme Court in 2010 complicate this discussion, and
challenge settled assumptions about the utility and function of
standards in First Amendment jurisprudence.
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Court
invalidated section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002, which prohibited corporations and unions from using general
treasury funds for "electioneering communications" that advocated
I5. See R. George Wright, Electoral Lies and the Broader Problems of Strict Scrutiny,
64 FLA. L. REv. 759, 768 (2012) ("To find an interest to be either genuinely compelling or
slightly less than compelling typically requires broad reflection and the exercise of sound
moral and practical judgment in several distinct respects.").
16. See Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, What Conservative Constitutional Revolution?
Moderating Five Degrees of Judicial Conservatism After Six Years of the Roberts Court 64
RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 64 (2011) (noting that narrow standards based on specific factors only
minimally cabin judicial discretion); Stone, supra note 12, at 54 ("[Elven within the
deferential, intermediate, and strict standards, the actual scrutiny may vary from one case to
the next.. . .Gradations exist even within each standard.").
17. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1909 (describing O'Connor's minimalism
philosophy as case-by-case analysis that allows for more nuanced determinations, especially
when it is unknown how future cases will develop).
18. See Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 3 (arguing in favor of pragmatic balancing as the
proper interpretative guide); Araiza, supra note 8, at 836 (noting that "rigid, acontextual
standards simply do not work in all cases"). Araiza argues that both strict standards and
balancing have their flaws but that while it is possible that "standards provide the false
certainty of a tough-sounding rule that fails when it is most needed," they may still be the best
option. Id at 836-37.
19. See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1907 (noting that Justice O'Connor favored case-by-
case analysis); Schlag, supra note 12, at 397 (arguing that Justice Kennedy strongly supports
rigid standards that function as categorical rules); Araiza, supra note 8, at 834-37 (analyzing
the Roberts Court and describing Justice Stevens' preference for more flexible standards).
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for or against a specified candidate for federal office. 20 The majority
opinion found the expenditure prohibition to be a content- and
speaker-based restriction and therefore applied strict scrutiny. 2 1 The
Court summarily dismissed the government's interest in ameliorating
the corrupting force of large aggregations of wealth in the electoral
system made possible by the corporate form-converting plaintiffs
as-applied challenge into a facial challenge and invalidating the law
without even remanding to give the government an opportunity to
22develop a record in support. The Court's decision held firm to rigid
strict scrutiny for so-called independent political speech (speech not
coordinated with a candidate) stating that "First Amendment
standards. . . must give the benefit of any doubt to protecting rather
than stifling speech."23 This adherence to a rigid strict scrutiny test is
in line with another 2010-term case from the Roberts Court, which
rejected the "ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits" as
"startling and dangerous."24
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project did not continue this trend.
The case involved the question of whether Congress could bar groups
of Americans from providing "material support" in the form of speech
to foreign groups that the government had designated as "foreign
terrorists organizations" (FTOs) pursuant to section 301 of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, as amended
by the PATRIOT Act. 25  Two U.S. citizens and six domestic
organizations brought the as-applied challenge, including the
Humanitarian Law Project, who wished to continue their support of
the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by teaching humanitarian and international law
to those groups and engaging in political advocacy on their behalf.26
20. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 889-90 (2010).
21. Idat 898.
22. See id. at 967 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("If our colleagues were really serious about
the interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption, they would remand to the District Court
with instructions to commence evidentiary proceedings."); see also Millett, supra note 6, at 14
("[In Citizens United| the Roberts Court reached out beyond the question presented to it and
beyond what the facts of the case required to decide a broad legal question facially invalidating
a provision of federal law, and overturned twenty-year-old constitutional precedent to boot.").
23. Citizens United 130 S. Ct. at 891.
24. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010); see also Araiza, supra note
8, at 829 ("Chief Justice Roberts explicitly and forcefully rejected ad hoc balancing of the
value of a given type of speech against its social costs.").
25. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010).
26. Id at 2713, 2716; see also Randolph N. Jonakait, The Mens Rea for the Cime of
Providing Material Resources to a Foreign Terrorist Organization, 56 BAYLOR L. REv. 861,
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Although the Court found the restrictions content based, it rejected
the application of strict scrutiny and instead applied an undefined,
lower standard of review. 27  After a cursory analysis, the majority
determined that the government's interest in preventing terrorists
from receiving any form of support, even support not material to their
terrorist goals, outweighed the plaintiffs' speech and associational
rights. Crucial to the Court's decision was the fact that the plaintiffs'
proposed speech was "coordinated" with the PKK or LTTE and thus
deserving of less protection than "independent" speech.28
These two cases, issued six months apart, have left scholars
scratching their heads. What, if anything, does the 2010 term show
about the legal theory underpinning the Roberts Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence? Citizens United was a clear victory for
rigid standards.29 The opinion in HLP, on the other hand, applied the
opposite of clear standards. The opaque nature of the Court's
reasoning has led to confusion about what standard the Court actually
applied. It is not surprising that a number of commentators and
courts have assumed that the Court applied strict scrutiny, after all,
the majority acknowledged that the restrictions are content based and
871-72 (providing description of PKK, LTrE, and plaintiffs' involvement with the
organizations).
27. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2723-24 ("Plaintiffs want to speak to
the [FTOs], and whether they may do so . . depends on what they say."); id. at 2724 (holding
that the regulation does not "prohibit pure political speech"); see also David Cole, The First
Amendment's Borders: The Place ofHolder v. Humanitarian Law Project in First Amendment
Doctrine, 6 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 147, 158 (2012) (describing the standard of review as
"deferential strict scrutiny"); Peter Margulies, Advising Terrorism: Material Support, Safe
Harbors, and Freedom of Speech, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 455 (2012) (referring to the Court's
analysis as applying a "hybrid approach that blended intermediate and heightened scrutiny
with the avoidance canon").
28. See Humanitarian Law Project 130 S. Ct. at 2728 ("[M]ost importantly, Congress
has avoided any restriction on independent advocacy, or indeed any activities not directed to,
coordinated with, or controlled by foreign terrorist groups."); see also, Huq, supra note 5, at
21.
29. See Araiza, supra note 8, at 825 (noting that Kennedy's opinion adhered to a rigid
view of strict scrutiny).
30. Compare id at 831 (recognizing that although the court found the restrictions to be
content based, it did not apply strict scrutiny), and Cole, supra note 27, at 158 (arguing that
"deferential strict scrutiny" was the standard actually applied), and Wadie E. Said,
Humanitarian Law Project and the Supreme Court's Construction of Terrorism, 2011 BYU L.
REv. 1455, 1499 (2011) (noting that the Court did not use the term 'strict scrutiny'), with Huq,
supra note 5, at 20 (accepting lower court's interpretation that strict scrutiny was applied
without analysis), andRosenthal supra note 6, at 71 (describing HLPas applying strict scrutiny
standard).
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that they were directed at speech, not conduct. 3' Normally such
restrictions would ensure that pure speech (as opposed to conduct) is
subject to strict scrutiny.32 But this reading flies in the face of the
Court's repeated rejection of the plaintiffs' argument that their
proposed speech should be evaluated as "pure political speech." 33
The opinion distinguished the speech at issue from "pure political
speech" on the grounds that it is coordinated with FTOs. 34  In other
words, because the plaintiffs' speech is coordinated, it does not
receive the same protections as "pure speech," even if the other
triggers of strict scrutiny, such as a content-based restriction, are
present. Whatever standard the majority applied, it never claimed to
be using strict scrutiny.35
It is thus no surprise that pragmatists claim HLP as a victory for
pragmatic balancing. 36  They argue that the Court disavowed
31. Hunanitarian Law Project 130 S. Ct. at 2723-24.
32. See Cole, supra note 27, at 153 (noting that content-based restrictions generally
employ strict scrutiny, including those cited by the Court for content-based restrictions in
HLP).
33. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2722 ("Congress has not, therefore, sought
to suppress ideas or opinions in the form of 'pure political speech'."); id at 2724 (the question
at issue is "not whether the Government may prohibit pure political speech"); id at 2728
("Congress has avoided any restriction on independent advocacy, or indeed any activities not
directed to, coordinated with, or controlled by foreign terrorist groups."); id at 2730 (stating
that the regulation of independent speech may not "pass constitutional muster"). The dissent
notes that the content-based restrictions should be scrutinized "strictly" by the majority, but
were not. Id at 2734 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
34. See id at 2722-23 (rejecting plaintiff's argument that the restrictions ban "pure
political speech" because the plaintiffs "may speak and write freely" as long as they do it
independently).
35. This lesser standard of review helps explain the critique that the Court gave
significantly less scrutiny to the government's interest in HLP than strict scrutiny requires.
See Huq, supra note 5, at 25. Indeed, commentators who presume strict scrutiny was applied
have noted that HLP is the only still valid case in the Court's history where a content-based
restriction on speech was upheld under the strict scrutiny standard. Leslie Kendrick, Content
Discrnmination Revisited 98 VA. L. REv. 231, 300 (2012) ("Of [the Court's strict scrutiny
precedents], only in Humanitarian LawProjectdid a majority of the Court allow a law to pass
what appeared to be content-discrimination strict scrutiny."); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorell v.
Ims Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of Privacy, 36 VT. L. REv. 855, 870 (2012) ("1
am aware of only one valid Supreme Court precedent in which a majority of the Court has
upheld a content-based regulation of speech under strict scrutiny: Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project"). Rather than being an anomaly in strict scrutiny jurisprudence, especially given the
majority's refusal to explicitly adopt strict scrutiny, it seems much more likely that the Court
was applying a different, lesser, standard of review (or no standard at all). It strains credulity
that the Court intended the government's scant justification for the regulation as applied to
plaintiffs' proposed speech to set the gold standard for compelling government interests and
narrow tailoring.
36. See Margulies, supra note 27, at 516 ("Within HLPs parameters, the Court's
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traditional standards for restrictions on speech in favor of a practical
approach to the delicate problem of preventing inadvertent support to
terrorist organizations. While there are differing opinions on the
outcome of the Court's balancing act, pragmatists read the Court's
opinion as working relatively independent of the standards that have
characterized much of First Amendment jurisprudence. It seems odd,
however, that the Court, in the same term as Citizens United and
Stevens, would feel free to embrace ad hoc balancing with such ardor.
This Article's thesis is that the HLP opinion did not summarily
reject the use of standards, but rather that it utilized a standard of
review borrowed from campaign finance. While others have noted
the importance of the categorization of speech as coordinated or
independent in Citizens United and HL 38 there is yet no sufficient
analysis of whether "coordination" has the same meaning in both
contexts. This Article proposes that the Court's use of independent
versus coordinated speech reveals that both cases are applying the
same, or substantially similar, dichotomy despite the different
meanings of the word "coordination" in each context. It argues that
the standard of review for contributions developed in earlier
campaign finance doctrine has lost its moorings and evolved into a
focus on coordination in Citizens United and that this is the standard
of review borrowed by the Court in HLP Further still, there is no
support for a standard of review that devalues or inflates the type of
speech at issue based on its level of coordination in either case.
B. A Standard is Born: Coordination in the Realm of Campaign
Finance Law
The search for the definition of "coordination" must start with
Buckley v. Valeo, which laid out the rubric used to evaluate campaign
finance restrictions. Buckley analyzed the spending caps on
contributions made to political campaigns (contributions) and direct
holding appropriately trades off doctrinal elegance for pragmatic results."); Rosenthal, supra
note 6, at 71 (arguing that HLJs holding "demonstrates that First Amendment jurisprudence is
at its core about balancing and not categorical protection").
37. See Margulies, supra note 27, at 516; Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 71.
38. See Cole, supra note 27, at 166-67 (noting briefly that the rationale for the idea of
coordination in campaign finance cases does not transfer to I); Huq, supra note 5; Peter
Margulies, Accountable Altruism: The Impact of the Federal Material Support Statute on
Humanitarian Aid 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 539, 555 (2011) (evaluating
coordination as discussed in HLPby drawing parallels with coordination in campaign finance
cases).
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expenditures on election communications made independently of a
campaign (expenditures) under the Federal Election Campaign Act.39
It found that the limits on both contributions and expenditures
implicated the First Amendment rights of speech and association.
Rejecting the government's argument that the restrictions regulated
conduct (the spending of money) rather than speech, the Court noted
that "[s]ome forms of communication made possible by the giving
and spending of money involve speech alone, some involve conduct
primarily, and some involve a combination of the two" but that "the
expenditure of money" does not "introduce a nonspeech element
or ... reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First
Amendment." 40  It also found that contribution and expenditure
limitations "impinge on protected associational freedoms" including
the right to affiliate with a candidate and the ability for "like-minded
persons to pool their resources in furtherance of common political
goals."4 1
After determining that limits on contributions and expenditures
both implicate First Amendment concerns, the Buckley Court drew a
distinction between the two types of speech.42  It held that
contributions to political campaigns are a form of symbolic speech as
the act of donating expresses a message of general support for the
candidate. Thus, the Court reasoned, the amount of the donation is
somewhat inconsequential and may be limited with minimal
interference with the expressive content of the contributor's
message.43 The fact that the candidate may use the contribution for
electioneering communications is not relevant to the question of the
contributor's right to donate because the candidate's expenditures on
speech are the candidate's speech, not the contributor' S.44
39. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7 (1976).
40. Id at 16.
41. Id at 22.
42. See Huq, supra note 5, 18-19 (recognizing the different standards of review for
contributions and expenditures).
43. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
44. See id at 21 ("While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a
candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions
into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor."). The
contribution and expenditure analysis thus anticipates three parties in the lifecycle of political
speech. A contributor donates to a campaign (either a candidate or association). These
contributions are a symbolic expression of support and association, which may be limited as to
size, but not banned outright. The candidate or association then uses that donation, amassed
with other donations, for its electioneering communications to the public and limitations on
that speech are judged by the standard for expenditures.
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In addition to symbolic speech, the "primary First Amendment
problem" raised by the contribution limits is their restrictions on "the
contributor's freedom of political association."45 Again, the act of
contributing is a way of associating with a group of like-minded
people and thus is a "fundamental" right, but limits on the amount of
the contribution have little effect on the ability of a contributor "to
become a member of any political association and to assist personally
in the association's efforts on behalf of candidates."46
Given the weighty First Amendment concerns, the Court
determined that the limits on contributions should be "subject to the
closest scrutiny" and the government must "demonstrate[] a
sufficiently important interest and employ[] means closely drawn to
avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms."47 It found
the "prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption
spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial
contributions" was a sufficiently important interest to limit, but not
ban outright, campaign contributions.4 8 Crucial to the Court's
conclusion was that limits on contributions did not infringe on the
contributor's right to speak in favor of the candidate or issues through
the direct expenditures of money to reach her desired audience.49
Expenditures are distinguished from contributions in Buckley
because the expenditure of money is necessary to facilitate almost all
modes of speech in a mass society.50 Thus, unlike contributions,
restraints on the amount of money a candidate or individual can spend
"impose direct and substantial restraints on the quantity of political
speech." 5  Spending money to purchase air time for a 30-second
commercial is not a symbolic act, it is a necessary prerequisite for
bringing a message to its intended audience-the less money spent,
the fewer people reached. Likewise, limits on the amount
associations can spend to "amplify[] the voice of their adherents"
infringe more deeply on the right of association than caps on
45. Id. at 24.
46. Id. at 22.
47. Id. at 25; see also id at 29 (noting that contribution limits were subjected to a
"rigorous standard of review").
48. Id at 25.
49. See id at 21, 28-29 ("Significantly, the Act's contribution limitations in themselves
do not undermine to any material degree the potential for robust and effective discussion of
candidates and campaign issues by individual citizens, associations, the institutional press,
candidates, and political parties.").
50. Id at 19.
51. Idat39.
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contributions by stifling the ability of the group to bring its message
to the general public.5  For these reasons, limits on expenditures
"impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms
of political expression and association than do.. . limitations on
financial contributions"53 and the government's justification must
"satisfy the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First
Amendment rights of political expression."54  In other words,
restrictions on expenditures are subject to strict scrutiny.
The Court rejected the anti-corruption argument used to justify
the limitations on campaign expenditures as insufficiently tailored to
correct the problem.s It found that the government's stated concern
with quid pro quo corruption was less likely where the speaker acts
independently from the candidate, thus the government has less
interest in restricting independent expenditures than contributions. 5 6
It is important to note that this dichotomy of coordinated and
independent speech is first raised in the context of evaluating the
government's interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption-not in
determining the proper standard under which to analyze the speech.57
Subsequent cases did not turn on the question of coordination
nor did they restrict the government to the quid pro quo corruption
argument.s The Court accepted the dangers posed by corruption
52. Id. at 22.
53. Id. at 23.
54. Id. at 44-45; see also Huq, supra note 5, at 17-18 (summarizing the different
standards of scrutiny in Buckley).
55. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-51 (rejecting a government interest in "equalizing the
relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections" as antithetical
to the notion of an unfettered marketplace of ideas that is central to the First Amendment).
56. See id at 47 ("The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure
with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the
candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as quid pro quo for
improper commitments from the candidate.").
57. Id. at 46 (first mention of "coordinate").
58. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990) (holding
that regardless of whether concerns about quid pro quo corruption are "sufficient to justify a
restriction on independent expenditures," the State of Michigan has a legitimate concern in
preventing "a different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate
form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political
ideas"); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257-60 (1986) [hereinafter MCFL]
(listing cases discussing the aggregation principal and then rejecting restrictions on
expenditures as applied to nonprofit issue corporations because corporations formed solely to
advocate political issues do convey, in a proportional amount, the political values of its
shareholders).
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from large aggregations of wealth made possible by the corporate
form as a valid government concern.59  Austin v. Michigan Chamber
of Commerce and Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life (MCFL) did not turn on the distinction of
independent versus coordinated speech-the court found that either
type of spending implicates the concern of disproportionate influence
from corporate aggregations of wealth.o In Austin, Justices Scalia
and Kennedy each penned scathing dissents attacking the validity of
any type of corruption other than quid pro quo corruption-such as
the idea of aggregate corruption upheld by the majority-and argued
that restrictions on independent speech are invalid under any theory of
corruption by virtue of the speaker's independence from the
candidate.6 Focusing on the distinction between independent and
coordinated speech, Kennedy most clearly reinterpreted Buckley to
make the perceived absence of the risk of quid pro quo corruption the
reason why "independent expenditures are entitled to greater
protection than campaign contributions."62
In Citizens United, the Austin dissents carried the day. The
Court overruled Austin and dismissed the idea that any type of
corruption other than quid pro quo corruption could justify a
restriction on election spending. In summarizing Buckley, the Court
noted only that contributions are distinguished from expenditures
because contributions are more likely to lead to quid pro quo
corruption, or the appearance of such corruption. 3 In this description
of Buckley, the majority jettisoned the reason why contributions
59. The aggregation argument is that corporations amass wealth based on their success
in the commercial marketplace but spend that wealth in the political marketplace of ideas in a
way that does not necessarily reflect the values of its shareholders or customers. These
expenditures artificially inflate the amount of the corporation's speech vis-A-vis its political
support. See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 258 ("Relative availability of funds is . . . a rough barometer
of public support. The resources in the treasury of a business corporation, however, are not an
indication of popular support for the corporation's political ideas. They reflect instead the
economically motivated decisions of investors and customers.").
60. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 659 (acknowledging the distinction between contributions
and expenditures, but recognizing that precedent left open the possibility to "demonstrate a
danger of real or apparent corruption posed by . .. expenditures").
61. Id at 683-84 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that quid pro quo corruption is the only
meaning for the word "corruption" and that independent advocacy does not pose a substantial
risk of it); id at 703 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (rejecting notion that the aggregation concern is
a form of corruption or that independent expenditures could pose a risk of "true" corruption).
62. See id at 702 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Candidate campaign contributions are
subject to greater regulation because of the enhanced risk of corruption. . . independent
expenditures pose no such risk.").
63. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 901-02 (2010).
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deserve less protection than expenditures-because they are symbolic
rather than pure speech-and instead focused on the fit between the
government's rationale and the restrictions." This led to the
solidification of the focus on coordination versus independent speech
as the dividing line in determining what value to place on speech in
the campaign context-in essence putting the cart before the horse by
prioritizing the importance and fit of the government interest to
determine what level of protection a category of speech should be
afforded.
C Humanitanan Law Project: Coordination Expands
In HLP, the Court once again raised the issue of coordinated
versus independent speech in an entirely different context-the war
on terror. Considering the plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge, the
Court rejected the government's argument that intermediate scrutiny
should apply because the statute regulates conduct with only an
incidental burden on speech. 5 Intermediate scrutiny was not the
proper standard of review, the Court reasoned, because the statute is
content based-"Plaintiffs want to speak to the [FTOs], and whether
they may do so under [the statute] depends on what they say." 66 Even
though the statute generally regulates conduct, the Court recognized
that "as applied to plaintiffs, the conduct triggering coverage under
the statute consists of communicating a message" and thus the
restrictions must be subject to "a more demanding standard." 67
However, the Court also repeatedly rejected the notion that the
speech plaintiffs wished to engage in was "pure political speech."68
64. Huq argues that "the truly important doctrinal distinction... is between
independent and coordinated speech" because the Court recognized that a contributor could
merely contact a candidate and ask what type of advertising they need and then run that
advertising with the candidates "'approval (or wink or nod)."' Huq, supra note 5, at 18. This
position ignores the Buckley Court's reasoning supporting the differing value of speech for
contributions and expenditures. See id at 9. As it turns out, the distinction between
independent and coordinated spending may not even function as an effective dividing line as
modem Super PACs coordinate with candidates through winks and nods in the media and
through cross staffing to an extent that greatly limits the anti-corruption value assigned to so-
called "independent" speech. See, e.g., Mike McIntire & Michael Luo, Fine Line Between
'Super PACs' and Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2012, at Al ("In practice, super PACs
have become a way for candidates to bypass the limits by steering rich donors to these
ostensibly independent groups, which function almost as adjuncts of the campaigns.").
65. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2010).
66. Id at 2723-24.
67. Id at 2724.
68. Id at 2722 ("Congress has not, therefore, sought to suppress ideas or opinions in the
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The crux of the Court's reasoning is that the plaintiffs' proposed
speech would be coordinated with FTOs, which transforms the speech
into something less than pure speech, deserving of less stringent
scrutiny. 69  The Court declined to define what level of coordination
would be necessary to fall within the statute and trigger this lower
standard because it claimed the plaintiffs had not provided sufficient
articulation of "the degree to which they seek to coordinate their
advocacy."70
Despite finding that the "most important" factor weighing in
favor of the statute's constitutionality is that it respects the divide
between coordinated and independent speech, the majority opinion
did not provide a single citation as to why "coordinated" speech as a
category is deserving of lesser protection than "independent"
speech .7  The majority provided a litany of ways that support for an
FTO's legitimate aims can be co-opted into support for their terrorist
activities, 7 2 but, like coordination in Buckley and Citizens Unite4
form of 'pure political speech."'); id at 2724 (explaining that the question at issue is "not
whether the Government may prohibit pure political speech"); id at 2728 ("Congress has
avoided any restriction on independent advocacy, or indeed any activities not directed to,
coordinated with, or controlled by foreign terrorist groups."); id at 2730 (clarifying by stating
that the majority "in no way suggest[s] that a regulation of independent speech would pass
constitutional muster").
69. See id at 2728 ("Finally, and most importantly, Congress has avoided any
restriction on independent advocacy, or indeed any activities not directed to, coordinated with,
or controlled by foreign terrorist groups."). The Court also relied on the
independent/coordinated distinction to reject the vagueness challenge advanced by plaintiffs to
avoid the constitutional question. Because it is clear that "personnel" and "service"
encompasses only coordinated speech, and clearly excludes independent advocacy, the
definitions were found to be specific enough to cabin the regulations so as to only restrict
lesser protected, coordinated speech. Id at 2722.
70. Id. at 2722 (emphasis in original). The dissent rejects this characterization of the
record. Id. at 2743 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing to complaints and affidavits in the record
that "describe in detail the forms of advocacy these groups have previously engaged in and in
which they would like to continue to engage"); see also Said, supra note 30, at 1497 (noting
that the type of coordination plaintiffs envisioned was "clear and specific and the Supreme
Court should have answered the question, even in the pre-enforcement context"). The true
nature of the record in HLP is less important for this argument than the fact that the legal
standard the majority utilized is one in which coordination, or lack thereof, is the determining
factor in analyzing the protection available to speech.
71. See Hwnanitaian Law Projec4 130 S. Ct. at 2733 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting
that '[c]oordination' with a group that engages in unlawful activity... does not deprive the
plaintiffs of the First Amendment's protection under any traditional 'categorical' exception to
its protection").
72. For example, the Court raised the fact that FTOs generally lack firewalls, which can
allow humanitarian donations to be used in furtherance of terrorist ends. Id at 2724; see also
id. at 2725 (suggesting that the provision of material support "frees up other resources within
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these factors spoke only to the weight of and proper tailoring to the
government interest. They provided no justification for why
"coordinated" political speech is not "pure political speech" or why
the content-based restriction on speech should fail to trigger strict
scrutiny.73
Looking at the opinion as a whole, there is ample support for the
hypothesis that the Court in HLP did indeed intend to create (or
reinforce) a category of speech distinct from standard strict scrutiny.
The majority took care to note that they "in no way suggest that a
regulation of independent speech would pass constitutional muster,
even if the Government were to show that such speech benefits
foreign terrorist organizations."74 In other words, the standard of
review for coordinated and independent speech (which is subject to
strict scrutiny) are divergent enough that-even with identical
government interests at play-one may be restricted while the other is
sacrosanct.
This parallels the divide between contributions and expenditures
in Buckley, where expenditures received the type of strict scrutiny
normally associated with content-based restrictions-strict in theory,
fatal in fact.7 Restrictions on contributions, on the other hand,
received a close tailoring analysis, but the standard of review was
lenient enough to allow some restrictions on contributions to stand.
This divide between contribution and expenditure subtly shifted both
linguistically and substantively to a dichotomy of coordinated and
independent speech in Citizens United76  Thus, it would appear that
the organization that may be put to violent ends," and that support lends legitimacy to FTOs
making it easier for them to raise funds and recruit members). The legitimacy of these
government justifications as applied to plaintiffs' speech will be explored in Part III of this
Article.
73. Margulies argues that the Court intended coordination to mean the regulation of the
agency relationship between plaintiffs and FTOs and that the lower standard of review can be
explained by deference to regulations on agency relationships such as the relationship between
a lawyer and client. Margulies, supra note 27, at 486. This argument does not address the fact
that the Court in HLPappears to require a significantly less involved relationship between two
entities than an agency relationship requires. Also, it ignores the fact that if the Court intended
to limit "coordination" to only cases involving agency relationships, it could have simply said
so and imported the law of agency to answer the question of how much coordination is
required to trigger lower scrutiny instead of punting the question. See supra note 70 and
accompanying text.
74. Humanitarian Law Project 130 S. Ct. at 2730. The Court also noted that
prohibitions on material support to domestic organizations may not pass constitutional muster
either. This issue is addressed in Part III.
75. See supra Part I.B.
76. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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the Court borrowed the idea of "coordination" as a separate category
of speech from Buckley, or more specifically, the characterization of
Buckley in Citizens United."
The Court did not make the distinction between coordinated and
independent speech in HLP in weighing the government's interest in
restricting the speech, but rather in determining the type of speech at
issue and, as follows, the standard by which to review it." Thus the
Court reviewed the speech at a standard similar to Buckley's review
of campaign contributions-more demanding than intermediate
scrutiny but less rigorous than strict scrutiny-what this Article refers
to as the coordination standard. The coordination standard is one that,
unlike strict scrutiny, is not fatal in fact for content-based
79restrictions.
II. THE COORDINATION CONUNDRUM
This Part argues that LPadopted a standard of review from the
campaign finance cases that improperly focuses on the government
interest in coordination to determine the value of speech-the
coordination standard. It then demonstrates that, given its origins,
77. Further supporting this argument is the Court's summary dismissal of plaintiffs'
freedom of association claim. Without determining the precise associational interests involved
in plaintiffs' challenge, the Court found that plaintiffs' association rights were at best
coterminous with their speech rights and thus the same government interests justified the
restrictions. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2730-31. Recall that in Buckley the
Court granted contributions less speech protections because they are rooted primarily in
freedom of association, which has traditionally been granted less protection than pure speech.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24 (1975) ("[T]he primary First Amendment problem raised by
the Act's contribution limitations is their restriction of one aspect of the contributor's freedom
of political association."). Again, the Court equates the speech at issue in fLPwith the lesser
standard provided to contributions in Buckley. Whether the devaluing of the right of
association is normatively justifiable is an open question. Ashutosh Bhagwat makes a
compelling case that "[dlespite the biases of the modern Court and most modern scholarship,
free speech should not be given any precedence in the relationship between free speech and the
freedoms of assembly, association, and petition." Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech,
120 YALE L.J. 978, 994 (2011).
78. Humanitarian Law Project 130 S. Ct. at 2722-23 (The restriction does not ban
"pure political speech" because it "does not prohibit independent advocacy or expression of
any kind.").
79. Although the coordination standard was not articulated as a distinct standard in the
HLPopinion, it does function as one. The Court used it to demote content restricted speech to
less than pure political speech and to take away the protection provided by strict scrutiny. See
supra note 33 and accompanying text. This is not the first incremental standard the Roberts
Court has employed in a constitutional contexts. See Rhodes, supra note 16, at 63 (noting the
Roberts Court's penchant for standards that are "either narrowly crafted or subject to an
uncertain underlying categorization scheme allowing for discretion in future cases").
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this standard is a poor fit for evaluating the type speech at issue in
HLP.
A. The Coordination Standard
Although the Court did not cite Citizens United in HLP, the
language of the two cases is similar enough that commentators have
drawn parallels between the doctrinal distinctions made in both
cases.80  That the Court felt confident enough in the lesser value of
coordinated speech that they did not feel the need to shore up the
claim by building an argument drawing from various sources suggests
that the Court had a pre-existing standard in mind-the coordination
standard.
Supporters of doctrinal standards should not take this as cause
for celebration. Strict categorical rules are meant to "keep[] the starch
in the standards for those moments when the daily politics cries
loudest for limiting what may be said."82 While there is debate as to
whether categorical evaluations are or should be the driving force
behind the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence,83 to the extent
they have value, it is in providing a framework that separates the
value of speech using a content-neutral perspective from the political
hot-button issues of the day.84 Without that separation, standards do
not ameliorate the danger of political cries for limitations on
unpopular speech. If a categorical approach allows the government
interest to bleed into the question of what standard of review to apply,
it loses its value as a normative tool.
Determining the value of the government's interest in restricting
speech and considering whether the restrictions are sufficiently
tailored to meet those ends inevitably requires value judgments.
80. See Huq, supra note 5, at 24 (noting the "divergent standards of strictness in the
review for regulations of independent and coordinated speech" in Citizens Unitedand HLP);
see also Margulies, supra note 38, at 555 (comparing the coordination rationale in ILP with
campaign finance cases).
81. At least one commentator has taken the Court's lead and accepted, without analysis
or citation outside of IE-P, the notion that coordinated speech is de facto less valuable than
"independent" speech. See Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 71 (stating without citation that
"[i]ndependent advocacy, of course, implicates weightier liberty interests").
82. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 774 (1996)
(Souter, J., concurring).
83. See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 6.
84. See Rhodes, supra note 16, at 64 (noting that narrow rules based on specific factors
lose the value of predictability).
85. Wright, supra note 15, at 768 ("To find an interest to be either genuinely compelling
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Standards are meant to prevent these value judgments from overriding
the protection of unpopular speech by setting a minimum level of
protection based on the values inherent in the First Amendment-
such as a robust marketplace of ideas or the freedom of self-
governance. 86  If the standard is one that incorporates a particular
normative value that diminishes (or increases) the value of a
particular kind of speech, the standard subverts the speech at issue to
the value judgment incorporated in the standard. In other words, a
standard that is not content neutral does more harm than good.
The coordination standard is this type of standard-balancing
hybrid, taking on the worst features of both by combining the moral
certainty and rigidity of a standard with the subjective bias of ad hoc
balancing. It also incorporates as a negative one of the most
important values of political speech-its associational element.87
Putting a rights-limiting value into the standard devalues associational
speech and compounds the weight given to the danger that
"coordinated" speech poses.88 This, in turn, relieves the government
of its burden to justify the restrictions because the justification is
already built into the test.
The coordination standard is especially insidious because it
cannot survive as a universally applied standard without rewriting a
century of First Amendment law. The First Amendment canon is
replete with cases involving speech made in coordination with others.
Publishers have the right to coordinate the creation of true crime
nonfiction with authors, even if that coordination involves payments
to convicted criminals for their stories.89  States cannot bar the
coordination necessary to find clients and direct the course of impact
litigation between an association and its network of counsel, including
or slightly less than compelling typically requires broad reflection and the exercise of sound
moral and practical judgment in several distinct respects.").
86. See Araiza, supra note 8, at 836 (arguing that rigid standards "provide enough of a
thumb on the judicial scale to produce predictable results that do a reasonably good job of
protecting the constitutional value at issue"); see also Bhagwat, supra note 77, at 993-94
(describing main theories underlying the importance of free speech).
87. See Bhagwat, supra note 77, at 981 (arguing that "assembly, petition, and
association are at least as central to the process of self-governance as is free speech").
88. See Cole, supra note 27, at 163 ("The fact that the law selectively punishes speech
when expressed in association with another would seem to render the law more
unconstitutional (because it violates both the rights of speech and association), not save it from
invalidation.").
89. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105
(1991).
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the payment of attorney fees, even by content-neutral restrictions on
legal solicitation.90 Non-profit organizations have a First Amendment
right to hire (and coordinate with) fundraisers to solicit funds for their
organization and engage in advocacy-even though the commercial
speech of professional fundraisers is unprotected *' At its essence,
coordination is a necessary tool for exercising the right of association,
so it is unsurprising that it frequently arises in tandem with First
Amendment claims.
The First Amendment canon is not free of outliers in this
regard-courts have stumbled in the protection of unpopular
associations. Convictions for speech made in connection with radical
labor movements like the Industrial Workers of the World or the
Communist Labor Party under criminal syndication statues were
routinely upheld prior to 1969." The threat of these movements was
not from actual acts of violence, "but the perceived unnerving nature,
to the ruling classes, of the [groups'] goal of redefining socio-
economic relations within the United States."94 By the 1960s, courts
began to draw "what appeared to be a clear line between advocacy
and action, with the former protected and the latter criminalized.'
This shift culminated in the overturning of Whitney v. California in
Bradenburg v. Ohio. Brandenburg articulated the "imminent danger"
test-holding that advocacy may only be criminalized when it
constitutes an "incitement to imminent lawless action."
90. SeeNAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
91. See Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); Sec'y
of State of Md. v, John H. Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
92. Bhagwat, supra note 77, at 986-89 (detailing the history of First Amendment cases
with strong associational elements).
93. See Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Bums v. United States, 274 U.S. 328
(1927); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 495-97 (1951) (upholding prosecutions on
speech even when the advocacy of violent overthrow was not realistic); see also Said, supra
note 30 ("During the first part of the twentieth century, radical labor unions were considered so
illegitimate .. . that even nonviolent speech could be equated to violence in service of such
groups.").
94. Said, supra note 30, at 1464.
95. Id at 1470 (describing history of cases involving membership in the Communist
Party); see also Bhagwat, supra note 77, at 1003-05 (describing evolution of incitement cases
leading from little protection for dissident groups to greater protection under imminent danger
test).
96. 395 U.S. 444, 448-89 (1969). The imminent danger test was applied even to
communication and organization with the Communist party, which Congress had made
detailed findings, was engaged in terrorist conduct in connection with the Soviet Union, an
enemy of the United States. See Cole, supra note 27, at 161, 168; see also Jonakait, supra note
26, at 908 (noting that the "prevention of violent overthrow of the government" in the
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Thus, if history is any indication, the coordination standard's
most likely use is selective application to cases, like HLP, where there
is a concern that the speech of a particular group poses a threat.9 7
This adds yet another layer of subjectivity when objective standards
are most needed to protect against restrictions on speech of dissident
groups and political factions.98 The coordination standard essentially
sidesteps the imminent danger test. 99 If broadly applied in cases
where the government is most concerned with groups who radically
oppose the status quo, the coordination standard could allow the
restriction of almost any meaningful speech by dissident
organizations without necessitating the direct overruling of decades of
reliance on the imminent danger test. 00
While the coordination standard gives the government great
latitude in restricting the speech of dissident groups-bulking up the
government's power in the national security context-the flip side of
coordinated speech, independent speech, paradoxically sets up a
nearly insurmountable roadblock to the government's efforts to enact
campaign finance reform. "Independent" speech is favored because it
is uncoordinated with the candidate.' 0' This standard, however,
presumes that the only valid government interest in electoral
corruption is the type of corruption that coordination is more likely to
prevent-quid pro quo corruption.' 02 Other types of corruption, such
Communist party cases could not have provided a more compelling government interest).
97. See Said, supra note 30 (providing a history of terrorism and attempts to restrict the
rights of dissident groups); Cole, supra note 27, at 149 (finding it troubling that the Court
"upheld criminalization of speech advocating only nonviolent, lawful ends on the ground that
such speech might unintentionally assist a third party in criminal wrongdoing).
98. See Wright, supra note 15, at 776 (noting that evidence surrounding hot button
issues tend to be "inconclusive, misleading, questionable, or mistaken" and thus a court
already exercises subjective preferences in determining whether to accept such evidence when
considering whether an interest is compelling or a regulation sufficiently tailored).
99. See Cole, supra note 27, at 149 (questioning whether HLP "calls into question the
continuing validity of the Bradenburg incitement test").
100. See id; Said, supra note 30, at 1470 (noting that since the 1960s, the Court has
protected the right to be a member of a terrorist group, provided that the member does "not
engage in any specific conduct toward fulfilling the group's illegal goals").
101. A distinction that is not supported by the underlying rationale for the original
reason electoral spending was divided into two types of speech. See supra notes 42-44, 50-54
and accompanying text. The distinction is also questionable given the rationale in HLP that
money donated for non-terrorist activities frees up money for an organization's terrorist
activities. Likewise, independent spending frees the candidate up to spend campaign money
on other expenses. See Cole, supra note 27, at 166.
102. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text (discussing the way in which the
coordination standard shifted the Court's evaluation of aggregate corruption).
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as the aggregate influence of large corporate spending, cannot justify
regulations because the standard itself includes a bias in favor of
independent speech based on the quid pro quo justification. Although
the divide between independent and coordinated speech was not the
original focus of campaign finance cases,103 CitiZeS United
confirmed that independent speech, by virtue of its independence, is a
sacred category of speech, and overturned precedent that had accepted
other corruption justifications.104 Again, the coordination standard
interjects a value-laden determination into the standard itself based on
the meaning of coordination in the context of campaign finance-i.e.
that only speech coordinated with candidates can corrupt the political
system.
B. A Poor Fit
This analysis shows an evolution of the coordination standard
starting with Buckley's division between symbolic contributions and
pure speech expenditures that was justified, in part, by the stronger
government interest in preventing potential corruption caused by a
donor's coordination with a candidate. The contribution-expenditure
dichotomy then morphed into a focus on coordinated versus
independent speech in campaign finance, and in the process lost its
mooring to the justification for the lesser protection given to symbolic
contributions. Finally, the 'less than' strict scrutiny review of
coordinated speech found its way outside the campaign finance arena
and into unchartered territory in HLP
The most pressing question for this hypothesis is, if the HLP
Court intended to use the standard based on coordination that had
evolved in the analysis of campaign finance restrictions, why did the
Court fail to cite Citizens United or any other campaign finance case
invoking it? The most obvious answer is that Buckley does not
support the Court's analysis in HLP.
A citation to the campaign finance cases would lay bare the
Court's misinterpretation of the original meaning and importance of
coordination in that line of cases. Most importantly, it would
demonstrate that the distinction between independent and coordinated
speech is not a method for distinguishing between two types of
speech but rather a way to evaluate the applicability of a particular
government interest-the avoidance of quid pro quo corruption-in
103. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text (describing original distinction).
104. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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the campaign finance context. Coordination was merely a factor in
determining the weight to be given the government's interest in
regulating the two categories of speech found in Buckley-symbolic
speech and pure speech. 0 5  Thus the distinction should have been
irrelevant in HLP as, unlike Buckley, it did not involve a
determination of what type of "speech" was created when money is
spent in particular ways. Plaintiffs in HLP simply wished to speak, in
the literal sense, with their intended audience.
Also troubling, are the divergent meanings of "coordination" in
the two lines of cases. In the campaign finance context it is clear that
the "coordination" that creates concern is between the speaker and the
candidate, not that with the speaker's audience.' While the
expressive value of the contribution-that the contributor supports
and has chosen to associate with the candidate-is broadcast to the
electorate through required campaign disclosures, the government
interest is not in preventing coordination between the speaker and her
audience (the electorate) but rather the speaker and a third party (the
candidate). Thus there are a limited number of actors for whom
coordination provides a compelling justification for restrictions on
their speech. A speaker is free to "coordinate" her speech in a myriad
of other ways: with any audience of her choosing, or with any
association or organization be it a PAC, a union, 1 a non-profit
organization, os or any mass media necessary to facilitate speech,
such as a cable provider. 09 None of this coordination removes the
speech from the ambit of pure political speech." 0
In contrast, the "coordination" raised in HLP is between the
speakers and their intended audiences. Under HLP, a speaker is not
allowed to coordinate the message with its intended recipient without
losing a significant measure of First Amendment protection. As the
105. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
106. Recall the "lifecycle" of speech where money contributed to a candidate (symbolic
speech) turns into an expenditure (pure speech) when the candidate spends that money on
electioneering communications made to the public. See supra note 44.
107. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2009) (striking down limits on donations
from corporation and union general funds).
108. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 497 U.S. 238, 242 (1986) (coordination
between members and non-profit corporation to publish campaign newsletter reviewed as
"independent expenditures").
109. Citizens Uniteo 130 S. Ct. at 887 (analyzing video-on-demand video whose airing
was coordinated with cable company under strict scrutiny).
110. In fact, the tendency is to move more speech from regulated to unrelated
alternatives. See infia note 123 and accompanying text.
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dissent in HLP noted, there is no logical stopping point for this type
of coordination.'11  Nearly all speech is "coordinated" in some
sense-including the speech involved in numerous landmark First
Amendment cases.1 2  "At the most obvious level, to organize a
public assembly requires informing participants of the planned
assembly, publicizing it more broadly to attract others, and
publicizing the occurrence of the assembly after the fact, in order to
influence the political process"-all means of coordination." The
same can be said for the desire to teach non-violent conflict resolution
to an organization struggling with the concept-there is no way to
effectively convey the message without coordination.l1 4  When
coordination with an audience is sufficient to remove the protections
afforded to "pure speech," only the lone man pontificating on a
soapbox can be certain to benefit from strict scrutiny. There is a
compelling argument that the communicative nature of the First
Amendment is least served with this type of speech." 5
The majority in HLP attempted to defuse the difficulty of
determining what level of coordination is necessary to remove speech
from the "pure speech" category by placing the blame on the
plaintiffs for their failure to specify "the degree to which they seek to
coordinate their advocacy with the [FTOs]."H 6 The Court's refusal to
address what level of coordination is sufficient to remove the speech
from strict scrutiny leaves the lower courts with little guidance as to
111. Humanitanan Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2736 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also,
Cole, supra note 27, at 166 ("Speech is almost always a relational act; we almost always speak
to, or in connection with, someone else.").
112. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105 (1991) (protecting speech between publisher and criminal author); Vill. of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (protecting relationship between non-profit
organizations and fundraisers); Sec'y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947
(1984) (same); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (protecting right of NAACP to
coordinate impact litigation with network of attorneys and clients).
113. See Bhagwat, supra note 77, at 998 (describing the interdependency between
speech, association, and assembly). Bhagwat points out that the ability "to form and maintain
associations and to communicate an association's views to outsiders" is necessary to preserve
"the structural purposes of the First Amendment." Id at 998-99. These prerequisites all
involve some form of coordination both within an association and with individuals outside of
the association.
114. SeeHuq, supra note 5, at 28.
115. Bhagwat, supra note 77, at 1012 (arguing that the "lone, street-corner speaker"
contributes "nothing to First Amendment values if no one is listening").
116. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. It strikes one as unfair to hold the
plaintiffs responsible for not sufficiently addressing the requirements for a category of speech
that is first mentioned in the Court's decision.
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how to apply this new standard and could lead to potentially ad hoc
results where lower courts guess at how much "coordination" is
necessary to tip the scales. This type of uncertainty in the law,
especially with respect to the regulation of speech, raises serious
concerns about the chilling effect of the regulation and is thus
generally disfavored." 7 Would uploading a video on how to sneak
explosives onto an airplane and merely emailing Hamas the website
link trigger strict scrutiny, while sending invitations to attend a
seminar on non-violent protest to members of the PKK and
interacting with the seminar attendees would yield lesser scrutiny as
"coordinated" speech?'" 8 The distinction matters immensely because
the majority hinted that regulations of independent speech would not
necessarily "pass constitutional muster" even if the government can
show that the speech benefits a terrorist organization. 1 If the lower
courts are to follow the Court's reasoning, they must prioritize the
level of coordination over the actual harm the speech may cause
leading to potentially absurd (and dangerous) results.
While the HLP majority also noted that the restrictions on
material support might not be acceptable as applied to domestic
organizations, it is not at all clear that it rejected the coordination
standard in domestic speech cases.120 After all, as we have seen, a
similar coordination standard is already in use in domestic campaign
finance cases. The language in the opinion suggests that coordination
and a foreign recipient of the speech are each independent conditions
for the Court's holding. '2
117. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 891 (2010) (rejecting as-applied challenge
because "the interpretive process" involved in drawing lines on a case-by-case basis "would
create an inevitable, pervasive, and serious risk of chilling protected speech pending the
drawing of fine distinctions that, in the end, would themselves be questionable").
118. Margulies provides a fact pattern in support of the idea of coordination as a
valuable distinction by arguing that under HLP a group is prohibited from entering into an
"interactive relationship" with an FTO in which it answers a question that could assist them in
using terror to evade human rights law-for example, telling the FTO "what percentage of
operatives it can house in a 'civilian' site to maintain the site's legal protection from attack."
Margulies, supra note 27, at 500. However, he argues that HLPallows an organization to host
a seminar on international humanitarian law open to the public and knowingly allow a member
of an FTO to attend and ask the exact same question. Id at 502-03. It is difficult to see how
the government's interest in preventing terrorist organizations from gaining information about
how to use international law to shield their terrorist activities is served by the former but not
the latter. Rather than supporting the value of coordination, the fact pattern undermines it.
119. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730 (2010).
120. Id at 2730 ("We also do not suggest that Congress could extend the same
prohibition on material support at issue here to domestic organizations.").
121. Despite this, at least one commentator is hopeful that the holding in HLPis limited
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Finally, the coordination standard alters the balance of
government power differently in the context of campaign finance than
anti-terrorism regulations. 1' 2  In the campaign finance realm,
restrictions on coordinated speech move money to unregulated
(independent) entities as those wishing to contribute large sums of
money to campaigns must do so independent of campaigns. The
cumulative effect is lessening government control over campaign
speech as money moves from closely governed campaign
contributions to less regulated "independent" expenditures.123  The
practical effect of this can be seen by the proliferation of Super PACS
spending previously unheard of amounts on elections, largely free
from government oversight.124  In HLP on the other hand, the
restriction on coordinated speech expands government control, since
there are few practical ways to circumvent the ban on coordinated
speech, with the practical effect of blocking all available speech. 2 5
In this respect, the coordination standard protects speech in the
campaign finance realm while banning it outright in HER
The end result is that we are left with two competing meanings
of "coordination," that the Court uses interchangeably. While the
majorities in HLP and Citizens United appear to use the same
"coordination standard" of review, there is no doctrinal support for
to fact patterns that involve coordination, a foreign recipient and national security concerns.
Cole, supra note 27, at 171 (arguing all three are necessary and citing lower court case where
court struck down restrictions missing the foreign recipient). Even in those circumstances,
however, the coordination standard does not function as a proper measuring tool for the value
of speech. The issues posed by a foreign recipient of speech are isolated and evaluated in Part
III.
122. See Huq, supra note 5, at 27 ("What in the campaign finance context weakens
government and empowers speakers has the opposite effect in the national security context,
where it shifts authority from private to public hands."); Jonakait, supra note 26, at 896 (noting
that in electioneering communications there is an avenue for independent speech but
coordination with organizations may be the only way to access and assist certain populations).
123. See Huq, supra note 5, at 27-28; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21-22
(1976) ("The overall effect of the Act's contribution ceilings is merely to require
candidates ... to raise funds from a greater number of persons and to compel people who
would otherwise contribute amounts greater than the statutory limits to expend such funds on
direct political expression.").
124. See 2012 Election Spending Will Breach $6 Billion, Center for Responsive Politics
Predicts, OPEN SECRETS CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS (Oct. 31, 2012, 2:33 PM),
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/10/2012-election-spending-will-reach-6.html (detailing
the record spending in the 2012 election, most of which was spent by "independent" groups
who can largely keep the identity of their donors confidential).
125. See Huq, supra note 5, at 28 ("Use of coordination to demarcate bounds to
protected speech expands the authority of the government because the range of possible
substitutions for either well-intentioned or ill-intentioned actors is small,").
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painting with the same brush campaign contributions and the pure
speech at issue in HLP.
With this understanding, it becomes apparent that the
coordination standard itself incorporates a subjective value based on
the Court's evaluation of coordination in that case. In HLPthe Court
infuses the standard with an interest in preventing association with
disfavored groups. In Citizens United, the coordination standard
incorporates a rejection of the government's interest in preventing
forms of corruption other than quid pro quo corruption. When the
government's asserted interest aligns with the value incorporated into
the standard, such as HLP, the Court essentially double-counts the
value of that interest-first to lessen the burden on the government to
justify and narrowly tailor the restriction with respect to the plaintiff s
intended speech, and second to allow the government to meet that
reduced burden. As such, the coordination standard fails to curb
judicial discretion and allows courts to give undue weight to the
government's interest when it chooses simply by selecting a standard
of review that could apply to virtually any speech (as most speech
involves coordination of some sort) when that standard aligns with the
government's interest in suppressing speech. When the government
interest asserted is at odds with the value the Court places on
coordination, such as with aggregate corruption in Citizens United,
the standard serves to apply a discount to the government's interest by
negating its value before the merits of the asserted interest are even
considered. This has the potential to undervalue legitimate
government interests.
III. A TEST CASE TO UNTANGLE THE COORDINATION QUESTION
To explore this hypothesis it is helpful to have a test case that
isolates the factors at play in HLP and Citizens United An ideal test
case would involve expenditures of funds as speech, which includes
both types of speech found in the original contribution and
expenditure divide (symbolic speech and pure speech), as well as
speech "coordinated" between speaker and audience as HLPuses the
term. The test case should also implicate speech directed to foreign
recipients and the deference to governmental interests in foreign
affairs to better isolate the value the Court placed on those factors in
HLP In addition, the test case should, to the extent possible, allow us
to compare apples to apples by requiring the analysis of the same
governmental interests in Citizens United and HLP corruption and
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national security concerns. A law preventing donations of money or
fungible goods to individuals or organizations in a foreign nation1 26
meets all these criteria.
This Part will briefly lay out the justifications for this
hypothetical statute.127  It will then apply Buckley's two-tiered
standard, which focuses on the type of speech at issue rather than the
extent of coordination, to find that the original Buckley standard
produces outcomes in line with First Amendment doctrine. It then
tests the coordination standard, with its emphasis on the amount of
coordination between speaker and audience, against the hypothetical
test case and finds it fails to properly value speech-both from
doctrinal and common sense perspectives. This Part will then
compare the government interest supporting the test case with the
government interests accepted or rejected in HLP and Citizens United
as further support for the hypothesis that the Court injected subjective
values into the coordination standard-either artificially inflating or
diminishing the government's interest in each case. Finally, this Part
concludes with consideration of the future of the coordination
standard.
A. A Test Case-The Trouble with Development Aid
In the last 50 years, western donors have spent over $2.3 trillion
on foreign aid, yet an eighth of the world's population lives in
stagnant or contracting economies.' 2 8  During this time, many
previously impoverished countries have seen their economies grow
126. This law would further a governmental program to increase the effectiveness of
development aid to that nation, prevent corruption and spur economic growth with the intent
that these improvements will prevent a struggling nation from becoming a hotbed of terrorist
activity. It is described in detail in Part III.A.
127. The goal here is not to provide a convincing case that aid must be drastically
reconfigured or that, accepting that governmental aid should be cabined, banning private
donations should be a part of that solution. It makes no such normative claims. Nor is it a
commentary on the political feasibility of passing such a restriction. Rather, the purpose is to
provide sufficient support to utilize the fact pattern as a test for this Article's claims about the
nature of the coordination standard.
128. PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION 8-9 (2007). While the majority of the
development aid distributed comes from governments or multinational organizations, such as
the World Bank or the IMF, private donations play an ever increasing role in development and
are even outstripping the amount of money donated by the United States government. See
Carol C. Adelman, Comment: The Pivatization of Foreign Aid: Reassessing National
Largesse, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 2003 (noting that American private foreign aid is
estimated at $35 billion a year, three and a half times the amount of official development
assistance given by the U.S. government a year).
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and the lives of their citizens improve-they can truly be considered
from an economic standpoint as "developing nations."129 However,
there are around a billion people living in nations that, over the same
period, have seen their economies fail to thrive, objective markers of
health and wellness decline and in some cases, total governmental
collapse.130 Paul Collier, an Oxford economist, calls these countries
the "bottom billion," a term this Article will also employ, and argues
that "there is a black hole, and ... many countries are indisputably
heading into it, rather than being drawn toward success."' 3 1
A growing body of literature by economists and social scientists
suggest that rather than being a panacea, development aid might be
part of the problem.'3 2 A significant factor in keeping countries in the
"bottom billion" is poor governance.133  Aid increases bad
governance by encouraging "rent-seeking," i.e., the misuse of
government authority to misappropriate funds.134 "Because aid (the
rent) is fungible--easily stolen, redirected or extracted-it facilitates
corruption."' 35  Moreover, foreign aid "short-circuits" the link
between taxes and public services, severing the incentives citizens
have to hold their governments accountable for corruption.' 36
Even with new national government leaders motivated to clean
up corruption, reform is difficult to sustain because a new reform
government "inherits a civil service that is an obstacle rather than an
129. COLLIER, supra note 128, at 8-9.
130. See id at 7-8 (providing life expectancy, malnutrition and infant mortality rates
for the bottom billion); id at 9-10 (showing per capita income in the bottom billion has not
grown appreciably since 1970 despite impressive growth numbers in developing nations that
started the 1970s impoverished).
131. Id at 6.
132. See, e.g., id.; DAMBISA MOYO, DEAD AID: WHY AID Is NOT WORKING AND How
THERE IS ANOTHER WAY FOR AFRICA (2010); WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN'S
BURDEN (2009). There is a large amount of statistical and economic research available for the
evidence presented here, especially Collier's work, some of which is available at
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/aid.htm. However, given the limited goal of this
Article's use of the material, I have limited citations to more readily available summaries of
the underlying data to make the information more accessible. As noted above, the aim of this
Part is to provide an outline of the potential government interest that could be invoked for a
hypothetical test case, not to prove or disprove this development model. See supra, note 126.
133. COLLIER, supra note 128, at 69 (arguing that there is a "bad governance" trap in
which three quarters of the bottom billion's population lives in what can be categorized as a
"failed state").
134. MOYo, supra note 132, at 52 (providing estimate that 25% of World Bank funds
lent since 1946 have been misappropriated).
135. Id at 52.
136. Id at 58.
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instrument." 13 7  This civil service benefits immensely from the
current aid structure. For example, a study in Chad tracked money
released by the Ministry of Finance for rural health clinics. It found
that only 1% of the funds ever reached the clinics-99% of money
was stolen along the way.' 3 8  The 99% was not being taken by the
heads of state, the study tracked the money only afier it was released
by the Ministry of Finance, rather it was pocketed pieces at a time
every step of the way down the chain of civil service. It does not take
much to imagine how-bribes for building permits, payments to
police for passage through roadblocks, gratuities to provincial
governors and mayors for appointments to positions downstream of
aid flows, etc.' 39 Aid money provides corrupt individuals throughout
the system the ammunition to fight reformers at the top.140
Development aid also has negative unintended consequences for
economic growth in the bottom billion.141 Dambisa Moyo, a Zambian
born economist, provides a salient example: A mosquito net maker in
Africa employs ten people who, as is common in Africa, each support
upwards of 15 relatives. Concerned with the prevalence of malaria in
the area,142 a western donor sends one million dollars in mosquito
137. COLLIER, supra note 128, at 111 (arguing that civil servants are hostile to change
because they individually benefit from complicated regulations and aid expenditures that make
it easier for them to pocket development largesse).
138. COLLIER, supra note 128, at 66 (describing study).
139. Although anecdotal, during my experience as a Peace Corps volunteer I saw all of
these forms of corruption and more. To support restrictions on private donations, Congress
could call a virtual army of returned Peace Corps volunteers to testify that portions of grants
and donations from NGOs and private foundations necessarily find their way into the pockets
of corrupt civil servants as there is often no way to conduct business without paying "fees" or
"permits" for the privilege of accessing those in need,
140, Even if private funds are not given directly to government actors, local NGOs
generally must still go through some network of civil service to accomplish their aims. For
example, to provide services to children, international and local NGOs often work with the
school system to easily access children and their families. As a result, school boards,
principals and even teachers, along with the local governments that appoint them (and can
charge for the favor) have an incentive to work against reform as they have invested in careers
that allow access to these funds.
141. Large infusions of cash or imports also create what economists call "Dutch
disease," where removing the need to pay for imports devalues local exports by reducing the
need to generate foreign exchange to purchase imports. See COLLIER, supra note 128, at 30;
MOYO, supra note 132, at 62-64. This causes inflation and slower growth in labor intensive
and exporting sectors, such as agriculture. See MoYo, supra note 132, at 63.
142. The World Health Organization estimates that there were 216 million cases of
malaria in 2010 and that the disease killed around 655,000 people that year, mostly children in
Africa. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD MALARIA REPORT xiii (2011),
available at http://www.who.int/malarialworld-malaria-report_2011/9789241564403-eng.pdf.
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nets to the region. While the nets have their intended consequence of
reducing malarial infections, the influx of free nets also puts the local
net maker out of business. In addition, since the donated nets will be
torn or damaged within five years and there will be no mosquito net
maker in the area with the capacity to replace them, another donor
will have to step in. 143
Even small, individual donations can snowball into the
decimation of a domestic market. The vast bulk of clothing donated
to Goodwill, the Salvation Army and other charity thrift shops in the
West end up being shipped to Africa in the form of donations.144
These donations have led to a roughly 40% decline in apparel
manufacturing production and a 50% decline in apparel employment
in Africa and is arguably a large reason why Africa has been unable
to step onto the first rung of the economic development ladder-labor
intensive manufacturing.145
The problem of corrupt governments and poor economies,
caused and exacerbated by aid, has a wide range of negative effects.
Civil war is more likely to break out in low-income countries with
stagnant economies and poor governance.14 6  Large natural resource
revenues, such as oil, also help fuel civil wars, but donations from
diasporic communities have "been one of the key sources of finance
The best preventative measure to counter this deadly disease is to sleep under mosquito netting
to prevent the mosquito bites that transfer the disease. Given the severity of the problem and
the relative ease of the solution, the donation of mosquito nets is one often taken up by
humanitarian organizations and social groups. See infra notes 172-76 and accompanying text
(discussing the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America's national anti-malaria campaign).
143. MOYO, supra note 132, at 44. In Moyo's example, the donor is a western
government but non-profit groups in the United States make similar donations for malaria
prevention. See, e.g., Press Release, Foundation Commits $750 Million to Global Funo THE
GATES FOUNDATION (Jan. 26, 2012), available at http://www.gatesfoundation.org/press-
releases/Pages/renewing-commitment-to-the-global-fund-120126.aspx (announcing the Bill
and Melinda Gates Foundation is donating $750 million to AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria
prevention); ELCA Malaria Campaign, EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH IN AMERICA,
http://www.elca.org/Our-Faith-In-Action/Responding-to-the-World/ELCA-Malaria-
Campaign/Our-Work/FAQ.aspx#1-2 (last visited Feb. 8, 2013) (detailing how the Evangelical
Lutheran Church in America is attempting to raise $15 million for malaria prevention by
2015).
144. Garth Frazer, Used-Clothing Donations and Apparel Production in Afnca, 118
ECON. J. 1764, 1765-66 (2008).
145. Id at 1764-65.
146. COLLIER, supra note 128, at 19-26 (describing statistical modeling showing the
causes of civil war and the likelihood that economic growth will lower chance of war); id. at
26 (low income, slow economic growth, bad governance and abundant natural resources also
lengthen civil wars).
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for rebel movements."l 47 The findings are startling-a nation in the
bottom billion has a nearly one-in-six chance of falling into a civil
war in any five-year period.148  In addition, while aid on its own
(independent of the negative effects of economic and governance
problems) does not seem to make civil war more likely, development
aid has been a statistically significant cause of coups, which tend to
become repeating events that destabilize nations and increase military
spending. 4 9
Poor governance and weak economic growth are clearly
problems for the bottom billion, but these problems also spill out over
their borders. Because "conflict generates territory outside the control
of a recognized government," those who wish to pursue illegal
activity can use it. 150 Given Afghanistan's history of conflict and
poor governance it is not surprising that Osama Bin Laden and al-
Qaeda chose it as their home base.' 5 ' As Collier notes, conflict
nations have "a comparative advantage in international crime and
terrorism."1 52
Collier has suggested a plan for the use of aid that would focus
on a country in transition, after a civil war for example, and restrict
monetary aid to the target country for a period of time when, due to a
new group of actors at the table, the potential for reform is at its peak
but governmental competence is at its worst.15 During this time he
argues, the most effective use of aid is to flood the country with
training expertise to increase the capacity of the civil service and civil
society to root out corruption, increase accountability to the
population, and better manage future revenues. Because technical
assistance cannot be misappropriated, this plan prevents the
corruption that goes hand in hand with large amounts of cash pumped
into a broken system.154
147. Id. at 21-26; see also MOYo, supra note 132, at 59-60 (blaming Somalia's civil
wars on competition for large-scale food aid).
148. COLLIER, supra note 128, at 32.
149. Id at 105.
150. Id at 31 (noting that "[n]inety-five percent of global production of hard drugs ...
is from conflict countries").
151. Id The United States government has already recognized that failing states pose a
security risk by increasing the U.S. aid budget by 50% in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
See id at 73.
152. Id at 31.
153. Id at 111-16.
154. Id Collier also argues for a host of other solutions such as setting up independent
service authorities, changes to domestic policies that harm the bottom billion, voluntary
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Unfortunately, the transition periods when aid can be most
effective generally coincide with intense media attention focused on
the country and when donors (both public and private) are most
generous.' 5 5  This transition will be difficult and there could be a
concern those NGOs or foundations that disagree with the plan of
cutting off aid might focus their attention disproportionately on the
country to make up the difference-which would undermine the
efficacy of the program.156  It may be necessary to use coercion to
cabin the flow of aid to these countries in transition-both through
treaties for state and multinational government aid and by restricting
private aid flow.' 5 7
This Article will assume that Congress accepts these arguments
and enacts a statute that authorizes the State Department to enter into
a development project with a nation in the bottom billion where the
recipient nation (Project Nation) agrees to accept restrictions,
enforced by donor nations, on aid both from donor governments and
private organizations for a period of five years in exchange for
increases in technical assistance and other concessions, such as
international norms and charters for bottom billion governments, and many more. See id at
118-19, 135-56. These aspects of his proposal, while crucial to a successful economic
development strategy, are not germane to this Article.
155. Id at 106 ("Aid floods in during the first couple of years [after a transition], then
rapidly dries up. Yet the typical post conflict country starts [out] with truly terrible
governance, institutions, and policies. It takes some time to improve them to a level at which
aid can be of much use.").
156. This is especially true if reformers are ousted and a new government wishes to
resume the flow of aid. The key to any program is signaling both to investors and corrupt
entities within the government that the change cannot be undone for a period of time sufficient
to outlast corrupt holdouts in the civil service or military. Id at 90 (arguing that to lure in
economic investment, reformers must be able to credibly signal the market that the reforms are
not temporary); id at 105 (summarizing findings that aid causes coups because those assuming
control know that aid money will be there for the taking). Therefore any plan must be
irrevocable for a period of years. This may strike many as undemocratic, including NGOs and
other private donors. In reality, governments in the bottom billion currently take out multi-
billion dollar loans that saddle future governments with crippling debt. Even in the West,
future governments are responsible for paying the debt of past governments and are largely
stuck with treaties made under previous administrations. That distinction, however, may not
matter to an organization that sees suffering under a new government fighting against its
predecessor's development agenda, thereby necessitating a coercive method of stopping aid
flows into the country.
157. It is certainly not a universal sentiment that private donations should be prevented.
See, e.g., EASTERLY, supra note 132 (arguing against broad "big push" plans in favor of
smaller, focused projects, like those by smaller NGOs). However, as discussed in this Part,
there is evidence that Congress could marshal to support a finding that private aid flows must
be restricted for the transition period as well, which is sufficient for purposes of testing the
hypothetical.
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favorable trade agreements. Once a nation is designated a Project
Nation, a set of restrictions on the provision of material support,
including any money, property, or tangible goods to any government
entity or NGO working in the Project Nation goes into effect.' 58
Congress names it the Helping Yield Positive Opportunities Act, or
the HYPO Act.
B. Evaluating Standards Under the HYPO Act
An analysis of the HYPO Act is a fertile testing ground to
observe how well the two different definitions of coordination lead to
results in line with the corpus of First Amendment jurisprudence.
First, the HYPO Act involves the question of when and how money is
analyzed as speech, bringing the analysis back to the origins of the
coordination divide. Second, the HYPO Act so closely mirrors the
anti-terror statue at issue in HLP that it invokes many of the same
ancillary concerns, such as a foreign recipient of speech and the
deference to the political branches' judgment regarding foreign
affairs, allowing for control over those factors. Finally, the primary
justifications for the HYPO Act-the prevention of the corrupting
influence of large amounts of money on the governments of Project
Nations and the need to prevent failing states from becoming breeding
grounds for terrorists-pull in the government's interests in both HLP
and Citizens United providing an insightful analysis of how those
government interests stack up under different definitions of
coordination.
1. The Buckley Standard
An application of Buckley's original two-tiered analysis shows
that using content-neutral standards that focus on the nature of
speech, without subjective values regarding coordination injected into
that standard, leads to results consistent with First Amendment
doctrine.
In the campaign finance realm, it is beyond question that money
contributions and expenditures are the equivalent of speech. Citizens
Unitedrejected limitations on expenditures without any analysis as to
158. The restrictions could include exceptions for religious materials, medicines not
produced domestically or types of aid that have been found to not implicate the concerns
discussed in this part, such as microfinance. The exact contours of the restrictions are
unimportant for purposes of this Article.
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whether such expenditures equate to speech.159  However, not all
expenditures of money are equivalent to speech.160 The first question
is whether the HYPO Act's restrictions on donations are merely
restrictions on conduct with an incidental burden on speech, and thus
would be subject only to intermediate scrutiny under United States v.
O'Brien.161 This argument was considered and rejected by the Court
in Buckley for both contributions and expenditure limitations.162 The
key to determining the type of speech at issue is not whether the
expression requires the expenditure of money, but rather whether the
expenditure of money communicates a message. The appropriate
inquiry is whether "an intent to convey a particularized message was
present and whether the likelihood was great that the message would
be understood by those who viewed it."' 63
A ban on contributions to NGOs or governments of a Project
Nation would infringe on the expressive rights of the contributor in
the same way a ban on campaign contributions would. Potential
donors would lose their ability to express general support for the
recipient of the donation in the Project Nation and to join together
with others to express a common belief.164 This is the same message
of general support and association the Court found compelling in
Buckley for contributions to a particular campaign. Likewise, a ban
on expenditures to facilitate speech in the Project Nation would
infringe on the speech rights of donors to amplify their voices by
"purchasing" speech in the Project Nation.165
This brings us squarely within Buckley's analysis of these two
types of expenditures. When distinguishing between the two under
the Buckley standard, the crucial question is what form the money
159. Deborah Hellman, Money Talks But It Isn't Speech, 95 MINN. L. REV. 953, 955
(2011) ("The Court considered it so obvious that restrictions on spending money amount to
restrictions on speech that it needed no discussion at all, not even a citation to Buckley.").
160. See id at 964 ("If giving and spending money are always expressive, then all
economic regulations risk impinging on the First Amendment.").
161. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
162. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 ("We cannot share the view that the present Act's
contribution and expenditure limitations are comparable to the restrictions on conduct upheld
in O'Bnen.").
163. Tex. v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Wash., 418 U.S.
405, 410-11 (1974) (detailing the standard for determining whether conduct possesses
"sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play")).
164. See Jonakait, supra note 26, at 886-87 (arguing that the freedom of association
includes the right to act in furtherance of common goals, such as support of charity).
165. See supra notes 39-57 and accompanying text (discussing Buckley).
226 [49:189
THE COORDIN4TION CONUNDRUM
takes. If the money is a symbolic act meant to express one's
association with the recipient and general support for their cause, then
it falls under the "contribution" standard. 166  If, however, the money
at issue is spent to "amplify[] the voice" of the donors, the
expenditures are protected as pure speech.'67 These two categories of
speech can be thought of as contributions to a Project Nation and
expenditures to facilitate speech in the Project Nation.168
As proposed, the HYPO Act would cover a broad array of
donations to the Project Nation with some, perhaps most, symbolic
contributions expressing general support for the recipient and a desire
to associate with like-minded citizens. While some have suggested
that First Amendment interests would not be implicated by
restrictions on charitable giving,' 69 that view does not give sufficient
credence to Buckley's rationale for treating contributions as symbolic
speech, nor does it take into account the protections afforded the
freedom of association.o70  In general, charitable contributions are
made as expressions of the donor's values and belief systems.
Charitable donations are more expressive than commercial
transactions and tend to reflect sincere views about the donor's
morality, religion and conscience, which lie at the heart of the First
Amendment.' 7 ' A charitable donation is an expression that the donor
believes the recipient is worthy of such assistance and trustworthy
enough to make good use of it. Charitable giving also forms an
166. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21 ("A contribution serves as a general expression of support
for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the
support.").
167. Id at 22 (limitations on expenditures preclude "associations from effectively
amplifying the voice of their adherents").
168. While the contribution and expenditure labels may not be a perfect fit for this test
case, they will be used here for the sake of clarity and consistency in comparing the standards
set out in Buckley.
169. See Hellman, supra note 159, at 965 (arguing that charitable giving is not
sufficiently expressive to merit protection).
170. See Bhagwat, supra note 77, at 998-1000 (arguing that associations are necessary
to allow members to develop their morals and common values and to express those values to
others); Jonakait, supra note 26, at 886-87 (same).
171. See Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 629
(distinguishing between restrictions on soliciting for private profit and charitable solicitations,
with only the latter protected by First Amendment); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 636 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (advocating
position that community service involving the development of morals or self-improvement is
expressive); see also Jonakait, supra note 26, at 886 (arguing that the right of association
necessarily includes the ability to advance lawful objectives, such as the distribution of
charity).
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association of donors who have chosen to work together to solve a
particular problem-expressing both the idea that the problem is
worth addressing and that those in the association are the right people
for the job.
As the courts are loath to tackle a thorny constitutional question
in a vacuum, a concrete example is helpful-take Moyo's troubling
example of donated mosquito nets. The Evangelical Lutheran Church
in America (ELCA) is currently engaged in a massive fundraising
campaign to raise money for the purchase of mosquito nets for
donation to various countries in Africa in connection with local,
affiliated churches. Their project includes several countries that
would be prime Project Nation candidates, such as the recently
created South Sudan.172
On their website, the ELCA describes its campaign:
The ELCA, through the ELCA Malaria Campaign, is joining
hands with eleven Lutheran church bodies in Africa and becoming
part of an historic global movement to say, 'enough is
enough!' . . .
For many years, the ELCA has been building relationships of
accompaniment and mutual respect with our companion churches
in Africa. Together with our church partners, we are poised to
bring about a massive grassroots movement to contain malaria and
bring hope to those who suffer.m7
The donations of mosquito nets clearly contains an expressive
element-a declaration to the world that members of the ELCA
believe not only that malaria is one of the more pressing problems
facing the world, but also that the ELCA and its members have a
responsibility to address it. The associational element is also apparent
as the campaign is a decision on the part of members of affiliated
churches to band together with Lutheran churches in Africa and with
the greater "global movement" to address this issue.
The campaign includes other indicia of expressive meaning
172. Responding to the World: Where We Work, EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH
IN AMERICA, http://www.elca.org/Our-Faith-In-Action/Responding-to-the-World/ELCA-
Malaria-Campaign/Where-We-Work.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2013).
173. Responding to the World: Our Work, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America,
http://www.elca.org/Our-Faith-In-Action/Responding-to-the-World/ELCA-Malaria-
Campaign/Our-Work.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2013).
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inherent in the donation, such as suggested prayers to encourage
members to make a donation to the campaign. Such donations are
viewed as expressions of members' religious convictions in action: 17 4
Forgiving God, we confess that we fail to hear the cries of the
world. Turn us from selfishness outward. Help us to listen to the
voices of others who suffer, in our neighborhood and in our world,
and to respond with generosity of heart.
Lord in your ercy... hear our prayer.
Or they are intended to encourage secular leaders to act in furtherance
of their religious convictions:
Almighty God, you rule with a gracious arm and a loving heart.
Inspire governments and leaders to guide their people with justice
and to work toward peace. Teach us all to act with mercy so that
the hungry are fed, the sick are healed, and the vulnerable are
protected. 175
Lordmnyourmercy... hear our prayer.
Not all donations may contain such clear-cut expressions of the
donor's vision and desire to pool their resources to express their
common values and goals.17 6 For example, there is a strong case that
a donation by a women's group to a regional government for money
to create a sports league for girls communicates an expression of the
donor's belief that girls should have the same opportunities to engage
in activities that may traditionally have been reserved for boys in the
174. Charitable giving as an expression of religious beliefs is not limited to Christian
giving. Zakat or the duty to engage in charitable giving, is one of the five pillars of Islam.
Michael G. Freedman, Note, Prosecuting Terrorism: The Material Support Statute and Muslim
Charities 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1113, 1130-32 (2011) (describing history and purpose of
Zakat and how Muslim Americans fulfill this requirement with charitable giving through their
local mosques).
175. Responding to the World: World Malaia Day 2012, EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN
CHURCH IN AMERICA, http://www.elca.org/Our-Faith-In-Action/Responding-to-the-World/
ELCA-Malaria-Campaign/World-Malaria-Day.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2013).
176. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) ("[P]articipation in community service might become expressive when the
activity is intended to develop good morals, reverence, patriotism, and a desire for self-
improvement."); see also Bhagwat, supra note 77, at 1000 (arguing that protected associations
include not only ones with expressive goals but also those who ferment "political organization,
value formation, and the cultivation of skills relevant to participation in the democratic
process").
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Project Nation. On the other hand, there is less of an argument to be
made that a donation to the same regional government for general
budgetary support is as expressive.
A broad reading of Buckley, however, would support the view
that all contributions express at minimum a general declaration of
support for the recipient.'" The expressive nature of a contribution is
intertwined with the associational qualities of the donation.'7 8 Thus,
the standard for what constitutes an expressive association should be
determinative of whether an association's donation is expressive. In
the context of freedom of association, this bar has been set very low.
To come within the ambit of the First Amendment's protection, an
association need not be an "advocacy group" but "must engage in
some form of expression, whether it be public or private."' 7 9 Thus, in
Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale, the Court found that the Boy Scouts
were an expressive organization because its mission is "to instill
values in young people." 8 0  The Court thought it "indisputable that
an association that seeks to transmit such a system of values engages
in expressive activity."' 8
Likewise, organizations that donate to foreign countries in need,
including a Project Nation, are expressive organizations that seek to
instill in their members, and the general public, the values that form
the backbone of their work, be it a desire to live out their faith in the
case of the ELCA's mosquito nets or a commitment to gender
equality in the case of funding for girls' sports. The forming of an
association of like-minded people to better explore and express their
moral values, values that inform all manner of political decisions, is at
the foundation of the right to associate.182 The group's inability to
express their message of support by donating to those the group
identifies as a deserving recipient "significantly burdens" their First
177. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 ("A contribution serves as a general expression
of support for the candidate and his views.").
178. Id at 24 ("[T]he primary First Amendment problem raised by the Act's
contribution limitations is their restriction on one aspect of the contributor's freedom of
political association.").
179. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
180. Id. at 649 (quoting the Boy Scouts' mission statement).
181. Id. at 650.
182. Bhagwat, supra note 77, at 997-98 ("Citizens form their underlying values, both
political and personal (if it is possible to distinguish the two), in the context of private
associations. If popular sovereignty means anything, it surely means that citizens must be able
to decide what they believe and to cooperate in that process of deciding, free from state
coercion.").
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Amendment rights.' 83
While most donations prohibited under the Act would likely fall
into the first category of contributions with expressive meaning, there
would likely be some donations that more closely resemble
expenditures on speech and thus should be treated as "pure speech"
despite their utilization of money to facilitate that speech. For
example, take an organization in a Project Nation that uses donor
funds to provide writing classes for women from minority ethnic
groups, where women are encouraged to write about how their gender
and the cultural practices of their ethnic group shape their treatment in
society. The organization also uses donor funds to gather the written
product generated in these workshops into anthologies, which they
publish and distribute (again using donor funds) to libraries in the
Project Nation and in donor countries in connection with fundraising
efforts. In addition to raising funds, the books are intended to raise
awareness in the West about the struggles women in the Project
Nation face living their lives at the intersection of gender and cultural
struggles.184
Under the Buckley standard, money spent on the costs inherent
in speaking are equivalent to the speech itself, and money donated to
this organization would be considered pure speech. This outcome is
in line with precedent holding that preventing the economic incentive
to produce a work from flowing to the author implicates the First
Amendment rights of both the author and the publisher." Like the
restrictions in Simon & Schuster, the HYPO Act would place a
financial restriction on the creation of written material on the basis of
the content-i.e. that it is generated in a Project Nation.186 The fact
that the authors, citizens residing in the Project Nation, do not fall
under the protection of the First Amendment should be of no
183. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653 (presence of gay scoutmaster "would significantly burden
the Boy Scouts' desire to not 'promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of
behavior"').
184. This hypothetical is based on an organization in Namibia, the Women's Leadership
Centre, which creates such anthologies. Copies of several of these anthologies are on file with
the author.
185. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116
(1991) (striking down under the strict scrutiny standard a requirement that all funds made on
"true crime" memoirs be escrowed for five years to be made available to victims of the
author's crimes).
186. Id. ("In the context of financial regulation ... the government's ability to impose
content-based burdens on speech raises the specter that the government may effectively drive
certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.").
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consequence to this analysis as the donor organization as publisher is
also recognized to have a First Amendment interest in financing the
work. The NGO's ability to publish the work of their choosing-a
first person account of conditions for women in the Project Nation-
depends on their ability to find authors in the Project Nation, a project
made significantly more difficult without the ability to provide
financial incentives.18 7
This outcome is also in line with cases protecting the rights of
non-profit associations to employ fundraisers to solicit funds. The
Court recognized that "solicitation [of donations] is characteristically
intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking
support for particular causes ... and without solicitation the flow of
such information and advocacy would likely cease."' Thus,
fundraising must be protected because it facilitates further
expenditures on speech and is often a form of persuasive speech itself.
Just as domestic non-profits need hired fundraisers to solicit
donations and advocate for their cause, the organization backing the
book project needs the authors to produce work that will do the same.
This protection should not be diminished due to the foreign identity of
the authors. Even though professional fundraisers, like individuals in
Project Nations, have no First Amendment rights, the Court found the
organizations themselves still have a First Amendment interest in
hiring them.8
Admittedly, the weakest link in the chain of reasoning linking
campaign finance regulations with the regulation of donations to
Project Nations is the fact that the impact of expenditures is felt most
strongly in a foreign nation. The United States does not receive the
full benefit of the money "spent" in the marketplace of ideas,
arguably weighing against the value of the speech. 19 0 In a global
world, however, where hot-button political issues often include an
187. Id. (recognizing that the requirement that author's remuneration be escrowed for
five years makes it difficult for publishers who wish to finance true crime memoirs to find
willing authors).
188. Sec'y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 960 (1984) (quoting
Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980)).
189. Id at 955 (fundraising company did "not claim that its own First Amendment
rights have been or will be infringed by the challenged statute" and brought claim on behalf of
clients).
190. Some of the speech paid for by expenditures work its way back to the United
States, most obviously in situations where the speech paid for is meant, in part, to return to the
donor organization to be used to persuade other Americans to their cause, such as the books
written by women in Project Nations.
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international component, this distinction is less compelling.19' Often
those who wish to create change utilize both domestic and
international advocacy depending on which method they feel will best
achieve their purpose.192
Take a situation in which the Sierra Club wishes to put an end to
irresponsible offshore drilling practices in Angola that are decimating
the environment. To encourage oil companies to use responsible
drilling practices, they lobby Congress and attempt to garner public
support for a tariff on imported oil that is not drilled in accordance
with environmental safety standards. The ruling in Citizens United
gives Exxon Mobile a recognized First Amendment right to
independently spend unlimited amounts on advertisements supporting
legislators who oppose the Sierra Club's proposed legislation.
Outgunned, the Sierra Club may decide that a more prudent course is
to provide financing for an Angolan NGO's efforts to raise awareness
of the damage caused by unsafe drilling and mobilize the local
population to put pressure on their government to stop the polluting
practices. In this situation both the Sierra Club and Exxon Mobile are
engaging in political speech to bring about the result they favor on an
issue involving both international and domestic concerns. Both are
using money to amplify their voices. To give value only to speech
received in the United States diminishes American speakers' options
to engage in political advocacy and favors certain types of advocacy
over others.
This section has demonstrated that the Buckley standard leads to
results in line with Supreme Court precedent regarding freedom of
association, expressive speech and money expended in the
furtherance of speech. The coordination standard does not fare as
well.
191. Toni M. Massaro, Foreign Nationals, Electoral Spending, and the First
Amendmen4 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 663, 682-83 (2011) (cataloging cases protecting
the distribution of foreign speech and noting the cosmopolitan influences drawn upon by the
Founders); Timothy Zick, The First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective: Toward a More
Cosmopolitan Orientation, 52 B.C. L. REv. 941, 990 (2011) (noting that "[g]lobalization and
digitization of expression have decreased the significance of territorial boarders insofar as First
Amendment activities are concerned" and giving examples of ways in which "[t]he
marketplace of ideas is rapidly becoming more global").
192. Massaro, supra note 191, at 693 (arguing that "[t]he porous nature of modem
global architecture" makes "an emphasis on physical borders seem[] worse than quaint; it
appears constitutionally pernicious"); Zick, supra note 191, at 1000 (arguing for a more
cosmopolitan view of the First Amendment because "self-governance values are often
implicated in trans-border contexts").
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2. The Coordination Standard
If we accept that at least some, if not all, of the donations barred
under the HYPO Act are a form of speech, the question becomes
whether that speech is reviewed under strict scrutiny or the "less
than" strict scrutiny used under the coordination standard.193  If
coordination is the driving factor, then nearly all speech under the Act
could be categorically exempted from strict scrutiny. There would be
no way to distinguish between sending mosquito nets and funding the
publication of authors from the Project Nation because every form of
speech would require some measure of coordination.
As noted above, the HLP Court attempted to ameliorate the
effect of the potentially universal coordination standard by making its
holding dependent on the idea that speech must reach a certain
threshold of coordination to be considered "coordinated enough" to
lose the full protection of the First Amendment.' 94 The question of
nets versus books brings into focus the absurdity of this standard. To
"coordinate" a donation of mosquito nets does not necessitate
significant interaction with the recipient. A donor may simply
independently identify an area with malaria, search the internet for a
local hospital or government agency operating in the area and email
them an offer to send a certain number of nets to be shipped to their
location. An email of acceptance seals the deal with little
"coordination" between donor and recipient.
Contrast the book project, where inherent in the creation of the
speech is a donor finding the organization that produces work by
193. The question of whether cash or material donations are conduct or speech is more
of an open question under HLP. In an earlier iteration of the case, when material donations
were still at issue, the Ninth Circuit held that the provision of material goods or cash, even
those made to groups to engage in political advocacy, should be analyzed under intermediate
scrutiny because donations are symbolic conduct rather than speech. Humanitarian Law
Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court hinted that it agreed
with that analysis. However Buckley explicitly rejected intermediate scrutiny as the applicable
standard for the symbolic speech in that case. See supra, note 54 and accompanying text. It is
difficult to reconcile the disparate treatment of money spent on expressive activities in HLP
and in the campaign finance cases. See Margulies, supra note 27, at 485 n. 175; Jonakait, supra
note 26, at 905-06 (arguing that NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware requires that active
membership, including supporting an organization with material support, is protected under
the right of association). This Article will assume that the analysis of the use of money spent
in furtherance of speech in the campaign finance arena is used to evaluate the HYPO Act.
194. See supra note 70.
195. This is not to say that all such donations are relatively uncoordinated. The ELCA
program is heavily coordinated with its local affiliated churches. See supra notes 172-75 and
accompanying text.
234 [49:189
THE COORDINA TION CONUNDRUM
women whose voices they wish to amplify, maintaining contact with
the local NGO through the writing and editing process and
coordinating the funding of publication and the distribution of the
final product. Despite significantly more speech issues in play, 196 the
book project would be less likely than the mosquito nets to be able to
trim its coordination to a level that qualifies as "independent" speech.
Donors who wish to be actively involved in the process of producing
speech that will speak to their audience would stand little chance of
avoiding the coordination label.
The focus on coordination also penalizes the exercise of freedom
of association. The more a donor wishes to engage with the recipient,
to build a relationship that expresses their common views and provide
for dialogue that enriches the donor's understanding, the less likely
they are to have that association protected. 197 It is counterintuitive to
penalize those who wish to form stronger associational bonds, and it
is not rational to reward associational speech claims that lack a
meaningful measure of coordination within the group. 98
The flip side of "coordination" is independent speech. If speech
is "independent" any restrictions on it are subject to strict scrutiny.
The application of strict scrutiny to independent speech makes sense
in the context of campaign finance because independence is used as
an alternative label for expenditures, which are by definition pure
speech.199 But where does that leave the donor who simply ships
mosquito nets? Assuming his donation expresses sufficient symbolic
meaning, he has engaged in some level of symbolic speech. Does the
fact that his symbolic speech was made in general support of the
recipient community, but relatively independent of it, qualify it for
strict scrutiny under the coordination standard?200 That this question
196. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
118 (1991) (subjecting financial disincentives to publishing certain content to strict scrutiny);
see also supra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
197. See Cole, supra note 27, at 163 ("The fact that the law [in HLPJ selectively
punishes speech when expressed in association with another would seem to render the law
more unconstitutional (because it violates both the rights of speech and association), not save it
from invalidation.").
198. See id. at 166 (arguing that speech and association should receive at least the same
protection as speech alone); Bhagwat, supra note 77, at 1027 (concluding that association is a
key component of speech because "speech is not usually about self-expression; it is about
bonding, associating and attempting to find a community").
199. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
200. This perverse inversion of less protection for more involved donors is ironic given
that the most levied critique of development aid is that donors do not coordinate their agency
priorities (and the ensuing donations) closely enough with aid recipients. The story of aid
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arises under the coordination standard is a good indication that the
standard does not hold up as a viable method of correctly valuing
different types of speech.
C Isolating the Government Interest
As we have seen, the coordination standard injects the
government's justification for the speech restriction into the question
of the type of speech at issue. This leads to double-counting the
government's interest-first in discounting or elevating the type of
speech at issue and thereby lowering or raising the standard of review
and then again when evaluating whether the government's interest
meets that standard. This Section isolates and reevaluates the
government interest in HLP and Citizens United by comparing them
to the justifications for the HYPO Act and then uses the Act to
explore whether each interest is sufficiently tailored to meet the more
accurately weighted government justification.
The HYPO Act is a compelling test case because the
governmental interests presented are hybrids of those involved in
Citizens United and HLP The economic literature supports three
governmental interests Congress could turn to in justifying the HYPO
Act's restrictions. First, the prevention of corruption in foreign
governments and the civil service by cutting off the money that fuels
it. As the evidence demonstrates, until a nation addresses these
systemic corruption issues it is difficult for the support provided by
the United States and its allies to provide any meaningful assistance
to a failing state. Second, the restrictions help prevent the market
distortion caused by large influxes of foreign cash and material goods
that undermine the efficacy of the domestic market. Again, these
market distortions are roadblocks to the U.S. government's
development policy. Finally, there is a national security concern
underpinning the government's interest in development-that failing
states provide a fertile breeding ground for foreign terrorists. A
country with a corrupt government and failed economy is a loose
gone wrong is replete with examples of donors sending goods that are not useful to recipients
or sending the right goods to the wrong people. See generally Easterly, supra note 132, at 87
("The quest to help the poor has put far too little effort into learning about their informal social
arrangements."). Especially important here, the lack of follow up, oversight, and
accountability (all forms of coordination) is one of the root causes why aid so often becomes a
corrupting influence. A test that disincentivizes donors from working with local groups to
determine needs and efficient delivery systems and discourages oversight of donations would
exacerbate the problem the HYPO Act is intended to solve.
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cannon on the international stage.
1. The Government Interest in Preventing Terrorism
a. Terrorism in Humanitarian Law Project
In HLP there was no question that "the Government's interest in
combating terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest order."201
The question at issue was whether the restrictions on plaintiffs'
proposed speech help further that interest. The Court identified
several Congressional determinations regarding how the restrictions
on "material support" work to combat terrorism. First, FTOs "are so
tainted by their criminal conduct that any conthibution to such an
organization facilitates that conduct." 202  Donations to FTOs for
peaceful activities may be redirected to terrorist aims and, even if they
are used for their proper purpose, "free[] up other resources within the
organization that may be put to violent ends." 203  Second, material
support to FTOs "lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups" which
"makes it easier for those groups to persist, to recruit members, and to
raise funds."204 Finally, because of attacks by FTOs on foreign
governments who are allies of the United States, allowing American
citizens to provide material support to these groups would strain
relations with those governments.2os Before addressing the question,
the Court noted the traditional deference given to the political
branches in the area of international affairs and national security.206
The Court found the restrictions sufficiently tailored because
they only cover a limited number of organizations (designated FTOs),
are well defined, and "most importantly," do not restrict "independent
advocacy."207 Critics have noted that the "most important" factor-
that only coordinated speech is banned-is not in line with two of the
201. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724 (2010).
202. Id at 2724 (quoting § 301(a)(7)) (emphasis in original).
203. Id at 2725.
204. Id
205. Id at 2726. The Court provides Turkey as an example of a country where the PKK
has been engaged in a "violent insurgency" against the Turkish government and "[fjrom
Turkey's perspective" the PKK is involved in no "'legitimate' activities." Id at 2726-27.
206. Hunanitanan Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2728 ("The Government, when seeking to
prevent imminent harms in the context of international affairs and national security, is not
required to conclusively link all the pieces in the puzzle before we grant weight to its empirical
conclusions.").
207. Id at 2728.
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three government interests identified.208 Independent advocacy
would lend legitimacy to an FTO to the same or greater extent than
coordinated speech and foreign governments who take offense to
Americans engaging in advocacy in favor of organizations trying to
overthrow their regime are unlikely to take comfort in the distinction
that the American's speech is not "coordinated" with the FTO.209
The only potential justification that requires distinguishing
between coordinated and independent speech is the concern that
giving FTOs any fungible goods can lead to misappropriation of those
goods to further their terrorist aims. This raises the question-how is
a ban on training members of an FTO to engage in peaceful
negotiations with international agencies supported by this
justification? 210  The Court suggests that the FTO could "pursue
peaceful negotiation as a means of buying time to recover from short-
term setbacks, lulling opponents into complacency, and ultimately
preparing for renewed attacks" 211 or could use their knowledge of
how to work with the United Nations to infiltrate refugee camps and
use them as a base for terrorist activities."212 As the dissent and other
commentators have pointed out, two hypothetical situations with no
evidence in the record that these types of hypotheticals are what
Congress had in mind when prohibiting training as a form of
"material support" to FTOs are somewhat flimsy "evidence" that pure
speech with no connection to terrorist activities can be coopted in the
208. See id at 2736 (noting that legitimacy is conveyed perhaps even stronger by
independent advocacy and independent advocacy is not likely to sooth offended allies)
(Breyer, J., dissenting); Cole, supra note 27, at 165 ("On the government interest side of the
analysis, coordinated advocacy is no more harmful than independent advocacy.").
209. See Cole, supra note 27, at 165-66; Said, supra note 30, at 1503 (noting that
support for "legitimacy" argument involved no proof that legitimacy helps terrorist ends). But
see Margulies, supra note 27, at 495-96 (arguing that the "legitimacy" argument in HLP is a
"linguistic" flaw and that the majority intended to legitimacy to connote an agency relationship
between the speakers and the FTOs). Even if Margulies is correct, the result is merely to merge
the legitimacy argument into the coordination justification.
210. The bulk of the Court's support for the restrictions throughout the majority opinion
are ways in which funds or material goods could be used or misused by FTOs. See
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2725-26; see also Said, supra note 30, at 1503 (noting
that the majority cited no empirical support in the record for the idea that plaintiffs' speech is
fungible).
211. Humanitaran Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2729 (citing a book "describing the
PKK's suspension of armed struggle and subsequent return to violence").
212. Id at 2729-30 (citing a State Department affidavit describing how the UNHCR
closed a Kurdish refugee camp "because the camp had come under the control of the PKK, and
the PKK had failed to respect its 'neutral and humanitarian nature').
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same way as more fungible support.m
The hypothesis that governmental interest is counted twice under
the coordination standard could explain why the Court required so
little of the government to justify a total ban on plaintiffs speech.214
The Court indicated that it would not necessarily find the
government's interest in preventing terrorism sufficient if analyzed
under the strict scrutiny test.215 Thus, the value of the government's
interest lies somewhere between what is necessary for the "less than"
coordination standard and strict scrutiny. Analyzing the HYPO Act
through the same lens allows us to unpack whether the Court's
distinction in this regard has merit.
b. The Terrorism Interest Under the HYPO Act
The HYPO Act raises the same deference to governmental
decision making in foreign affairs. As demonstrated in HLP, the
Court generally is hesitant to second-guess the government's value
judgments regarding foreign policy, especially when national security
issues are in play. The argument that failing states are potential
breeding ground for terrorists should give Congress and the State
Department broad leeway in crafting solutions to develop stable
governments in the poorest areas of the world.
213. See id at 2735 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Cole, supra note 27, at 158-59 (arguing the
majority "offered up its own arguments" that the government never asserted and based its
support on conclusory assertions in the Congressional record); Said, supra note 30, at 1501
(noting majority only cites four sources that all came from government or former government
officials and were out of date). But see Margulies, supra note 27, at 489-90, 496-97
(describing independent sources not cited by the majority that support the government's
interest better).
214. See Cole, supra note 27, at 158-59 (noting that the Court relied upon conclusions
from the Congressional record that were not supported by factual findings and boilerplate
generalizations about all FTOs without individual evidence regarding them); Huq, supra note
5, at 25 ("[The HLPanalysis] is barely recognizable as First Amendment scrutiny at all given
the Court's express acceptance of loosely defined and evolving governmental goals on the one
hand, and predictions instead of facts on the other."); Said, supra note 30, at 1500-01
(describing limited sources relied upon by Court, which were largely outdated and involved
generalizations based on groups other than those involved in the case). The majority rejected
the characterization that the speech was banned because plaintiffs are still free to speak
"independently" of the FTOs. However the content of that speech (training in peaceful
diplomatic measures) is a null set if plaintiffs cannot arrange for the audience to hear it. The
Court's suggestion is akin to telling plaintiffs they are welcome to teach to an empty
classroom.
215. HumanitaianLawProjec4 130 S. Ct. at 2730 (noting that the government interest
would not necessarily be sufficient to ban "independent" speech, which is analyzed under strict
scrutiny).
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This justification is strongest when looking to a country such as
Somalia, where the lawless state has led to well-publicized acts of
piracy against foreign ships, including American vessels.2 16 But does
this terrorism concern hold up for restrictions on donations to Project
Nations that are historically allies of the United States? In HLP, the
Court was unconcerned with the fact that the organizations the
plaintiffs wished to train were involved in struggles against foreign
governments and not likely to focus their terrorist activities on the
United States, although it noted that both organizations have attacked
American citizens abroad.2 " The opinion never suggested that the
likelihood that a particular organization will attack American soil or
American citizens is a factor in weighing the government's interest-
leaving FTOs that are friendly with American interests still subject to
the ban.2 18 Thus whether a Project Nation is likely to harbor terrorists
with ill will towards America should not be a factor in the analysis.
By separating symbolic contributions from donation
expenditures, both the coordination and strict scrutiny standards are
present when analyzing whether a total ban is justified under the
HYPO Act. To prevent the corrupting influence of cash or other
fungible donations, a ban on both types of speech is necessary
because the money, not the speech, is the problem. There is no way
to allow an American organization to donate funds to a school, for
example, without providing incentive for people to enter the civil
service to have access to those funds. 2 19 This result is in line with the
government's interest in HLP with respect to cash or goods provided
to FTOs. Money or goods in the hands of FTOs is arguably a
problem, not because there is a communicative element, but because
it can too easily be used (or transformed into something that can be
used) to further terrorism. 220  Thus, in both cases, a total ban on
monetary or fungible support is the minimal restriction necessary to
address the government's concern regarding its use.
216. See Exclusive: Somali Pirate Kingpins Enjoy 'Impunity'-UN Experts, REUTERS
(July 17, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/17/us-somalia-un-piracy-idUSBRE86
GOZN20120717 (describing Somali piracy and the Somali government's assistance to pirate
leaders).
217. Humanitarian LawProject 130 S. Ct. at 2727.
218. See Said, supra note 30, at 1489-90 (noting that material support is barred to all
FTOs, even those with "no direct quarrel with the United States").
219. See supra notes 131-35 (describing how aid encourages corruption in the civil
service through rent seeking).
220. But see Jonakait, supra note 26 (arguing pre-HEP that even the material support
ban requires an intent element to be in line with constitutional precedent).
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Pure speech, however, is a different matter. There is no reason
for the HYPO Act to prevent an organization from sending someone
to the Project Nation to teach a class on the proper use of malaria
nets, run a writing workshop, coordinate with union organizers, or
any other manner of communication as those lessons will not lead to
the problems the Act was enacted to prevent-corruption and market
distortion that could lead to a failed state.
Likewise, in HLP whether the regulations still allowed
independent (or "pure speech") is irrelevant to whether the
government's regulations are narrowly tailored. The distinguishing
factor between pure speech and symbolic speech is the particular use
for the money provided. Without money at issue, the HLPCourt gave
no other grounds for refusing to consider the plaintiffs' proposed
speech to be "pure speech." 22  The proper question for the tailoring
analysis should have been whether the speech at issue has the
potential to advance the terrorist goals of the organization. If it does
not, then the speech is not fungible and it need not be subject to
regulation to further the government interest.
This is the argument made by the dissent. Focusing on the
definition of "material" in the statutory language "material support,"
the dissent argued that "material" should be read to incorporate an
intent requirement into the statute. 222 When pure speech is at issue,
the government must show that the defendant "knows or intends that
those activities will assist the organization's unlawful terrorist
actions." 223 "Material" is thus a requirement that the speech at issue
be "of real importance or great consequence" to the terrorist aims of
the organization or else it is unlikely to trigger the government's
interest in preventing assistance to FTOs in furtherance of terrorist
221. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2732 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("That this
speech and association for political purposes is the kind of activity to which the First
Amendment ordinarily offers its strongest protection is elementary.").
222. There is statutory support for such a reading. See id. at 2741. The statute defines
"material support or resources" as "any property, tangible or intangible," which necessitates a
definition of "material" that includes tangible and intangible assistance. Thus "material" most
clearly means "being of real importance or great consequence" and not "of a physical or
worldly nature," as the latter would encompass no speech at all. "Training," "expert advice or
assistance," and "service" are all defined as categories of "material support" and thus "these
activities fall within the statute's scope only when they too are 'material."' See Jonakait, supra
note 26 (arguing pre-IJLPthat the statute includes the requirement that support be provided
with the intent to further terrorist activities).
223. Humanitanan LawProject 130 S. Ct. at 2740 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
2012) 241
WILLAMETTE LA WREVIEW
acts.224  To bolster their statutory interpretation, the dissent cites
reports from the House of Representatives demonstrating that
Congress' concern regarding the provision of expert services and
assistance to FTOs was rooted in training that would further terrorism
directly, such as an aviation expert giving advice that could facilitate
an aircraft hijacking or an accountant providing training that will help
an FTO conceal its funds.
In such cases, "the act of providing material support to a known
terrorist organization bears a close enough relation to terrorist acts
that ... it likely can be prohibited notwithstanding any First
Amendment interest."225  Only this definition of "material" lines up
closely enough with the government interest to survive strict
scrutiny-or put differently, the speech falls outside of the First
Amendment in these cases because it is akin to the criminal act of
aiding and abetting a crime. The majority may have still used their
two hypothetical situations to justify the argument that training in
peaceful negotiations could be "material" to the terrorist aims of an
FTO, but under the proper standard these hypotheticals are more
difficult to square with the restriction of pure political speech.226
2. The Government Interest in Preventing Corruption
In HLP, even if the regulations were not sufficiently tailored to
omit speech that was not materially useful, the concept that providing
fungible support to FTOs could further their terrorist goals is
relatively clear. With the HYPO Act, the cause and effect
relationship is less transparent. In order to accept that the restrictions
on aid will help prevent failed states from becoming incubators for
terrorist organizations, one must agree that the type of corruption and
market distortions that aid encourages are the cause of the
destabilization of a state. The HYPO Act directly engages the
problems of corruption and market destabilization as the root causes
of state decline in the hopes that a secondary effect will be a stable
government that is an ally in the war on terror. Thus, the prevention
224. Id at 2741.
225, Id at 2740; see also Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498
(1949) (finding no First Amendment protection for speech that is an "integral part of conduct
in violation of a valid criminal statute").
226. A less charitable view of the majority opinion might suggest that the reason for
adopting the coordination standard and double-counting the government's interest was result
driven because the Court recognized that the government's support would be inadequate under
strict scrutiny.
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of corruption and market distortion are not only independent
governmental interests supporting the HYPO Act, but also a
prerequisite for the acceptance of terrorism as a legitimate interest
addressed by the Act.
The anti-corruption justification is the most compelling support
for the restriction of funds to a Project Nation based on the empirical
evidence.227 As Collier has demonstrated, corruption of the
government and civil service makes a nation unable to utilize inflows
of aid and retards economic growth. Large inflows of foreign aid
incentivizes individuals to pursue positions within the government
and civil service that put them at the receiving end of donor largess or
in a position to profit from those who wish to use donor funds for
legitimate ends.2 8 Those who misappropriate donor funds for their
own benefit then have the resources to push out the competition for
highly coveted jobs, leaving crooks in charge of the government and
civil service and the best and brightest pushed to the margins. 229 Any
advocate for the type of substantial change needed to attract
investment and economic growth must fight against these moneyed
interests who benefit from the entrenchment of the status quo.
Without a functioning government, markets have little chance of
significant growth as property and capital investments are not
sufficiently protected to give investors the comfort they need to put
money into the local economy.230
This government interest would put the Court in a tight spot. In
Citizens United, it rejected a similar aggregate corruption argument.
The opinion overturned Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,
which upheld restrictions on corporate campaign donations to prevent
"the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and
that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the
corporation's political ideas."23' In Citizens United, the Court, like
the dissent in Austin, described this interest as an attempt to equalize
the relative voice of speakers,232 but the argument is really that large
227. See supra Part lILA.
228. Seeid
229. See id
230. COLLIER, supra note 128, at 88-89 (describing how investors refuse to invest in
countries without functioning governments).
231. 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
232. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904 (2010); Austin v. Mich. Chamber
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 704-05 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id at 484-85 (Scalia, J.,
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amounts of money not tied to an individual's political preferences can
corrupt the system by giving disproportionate influence to corporate
ideas that are not representative of public support.233 Likewise, one
of the concerns with large influxes of aid is that the money being
poured into the Project Nations provide incentives that are not in line
with the goals of the majority of the population, but rather allows
certain players to manipulate the system for their own interests. 234
The analogy is not exact. The corruption interests at play in
Citizens Unitedare not identical to those implicated in the question of
foreign aid. In the United States, the concern is not that campaign
funds will end up in the candidate's pocket, but rather the effect that
money has on the system. An unscrupulous politician can align
himself with moneyed interests because those interests will devote
their vast resources to keeping a friendly politician in office. For
those individuals staying in power is the end goal-not the actual
theft of the money donated.23 But elections can be altered even with
politicians that hold steadfast values. Large aggregations of money
can lead to an outcome where candidates with a certain set of fixed
values (for example, opposed to environmental regulation) are more
likely to prevail because corporate entities can outspend the
candidates' opponents. Even if the candidate already supports the
corporation's interest (and thus is not tempted by campaign cash to
change his position), the campaign funds alter the landscape of the
election in favor of the candidates most in line with corporate
interests. 236
This is a gross oversimplification of the role of money in
electoral politics, a full analysis of which is outside the scope of this
Article. The important point for this discussion is that, like foreign
aid, the presence of money in the electoral system has the potential to
pull people who hold viewpoints aligned with moneyed interests into
positions of power. With aid, it is those who support a broken system
that allows for abuse of their authority; with election politics, it is
dissenting).
233. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
234. See supra Part III.A.
235. Personal financial interests are not irrelevant to the American public servant.
Many legislators enjoy lucrative post-government positions in the private sector consulting
corporations that they previously regulated.
236. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 149 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v.
FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (providing evidence that "soft money" influences Congressional
voting).
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those whose policies favor entities with large aggregations of
wealth."'
Despite the differences between campaign finance and foreign
aid, the flat rejection of the dangers of aggregate corruption in
Citizens United would make it difficult to uphold the HYPO Act even
under the lesser coordination standard. In Citizens United, the Court
rejected even the possibility that a corruption argument not based on
the prevention of quid pro quo corruption could support a restriction
on campaign speech, as evidenced by its refusal to remand the case
for the government to develop a record to support its arguments. In
essence the Court held that there is no possible evidence the
government could muster that would justify a restriction on
"independent" speech because it is, by definition, not coordinated and
thus unlikely to lead to quid pro quo corruption.238 In his
concurrence, Justice Scalia dismissed other definitions of corruption,
such as the concern that money in the electoral system may lead to
"moral decay" or that it "does not serve public ends" as improper
interests that would lead to unlimited censorship power by the
government.239
It would be impossible to square the idea that Congress may
restrict the speech of Americans to avoid corruption of foreign
governments but cannot restrict speech to avoid a similar corrupting
influence at home. 240  Given the extremely high value placed on
political speech relating to domestic elections, there must necessarily
be a discounting of the speech regulated by the test case. This lower
value for non-electoral speech, however, would be outweighed by the
higher interest Congress has in ensuring the integrity of our electoral
system versus its interest in preventing corruption of foreign
governments. It is impossible to reconcile a finding that corruption of
foreign governments is a legitimate government interest, sufficient to
withstand strict scrutiny, but potential corruption in one's own
237. Obviously the former is undisputedly a negative trait for a government official.
Viewpoint alignment with large corporations, banks or unions is not necessarily a negative
quality for a politician, but Congress was sufficiently concerned with dominance by such
entities over other viewpoints to enact the campaign finance reform struck down in Citizens
United
238. Quid pro quo corruption of foreign government officials, like domestic bribery, is
already prohibited by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -4.
239. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 928.
240. This holding would not be limited to Citizens United Even under Buckley, the
Court's concerns about quid pro quo corruption would only allow for a limitation on symbolic
contributions-not an outright ban.
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political system does not merit further consideration.
If the aggregate corruption interest is illegitimate, the other
justifications for the regulations begin to crumble and the HYPO Act
is unlikely to survive even the lower "coordinated" scrutiny, let alone
24strict scrutiny.24 Such result would be consistent with the value
given the government's interest in Citizens United However, the
result would come into conflict with HLJ.P
As discussed, the Court in HLP gave significant weight to three
factors: (1) that the speech is coordinated, (2) that the recipients are
foreign entities, and (3) the deference given the government on
matters of foreign affairs. 242 The HYPO Act is also a restriction of
coordinated speech with a foreign entity that would be justified by the
government's carefully considered foreign policy concerns. A
rejection of the Act would suggest that despite its emphasis on the
ways the speech in HLP differs from "pure political speech," the
Court's decision is not based on a convergence of those three factors,
but rather rests solely on the weight of the government's interest in
preventing terrorism.
D. The Future of the Coordination Standard
Taking into account the various government interests makes it
clear that the outcome in HLP, in large part, came down to immense
deference to the government's asserted interest in preventing terrorist
attacks. There is always a measure of pragmatism in evaluating the
normative value of the government's interest.244 It is tempting to
write off the Court's decision as pragmatic balancing requiring the
convergence of terrorism, foreign speech and coordination. 45 Given
241. The market distortion concern in this context would be an issue of first impression
for the Court. It could be used to buttress the government's antiterrorism concerns-low
income is a strong indicator of future conflict and a country with a few economic opportunities
is a fertile recruiting ground for terrorist organizations who can offer opportunities unavailable
in the legitimate economy. See supra Part III.A. It seems unlikely, however, that it could
support the weight of the restrictions under either strict scrutiny or even the lesser coordinated
standard on its own.
242. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730 (2010).
243. With so much riding on the government justification, it is even more startling that
the Court focused so little attention on the actual evidence the government presented regarding
the dangers of the plaintiffs' proposed speech. See supra note 45.
244. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text (discussion of pragmatism in
balancing).
245. See Cole, supra note 27, at 176-77 (arguing that a reading requiring all three
elements would "restrict[] the damage Humanitarian Law Project does to First Amendment
doctrine"). Although these three factors can be present in other circumstances without a clear
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the current war on terror, even this limitation is unsettling in the
leverage it gives Congress to prohibit political speech made in
connection with deeply unpopular international political groups,
especially if courts are willing to embrace a broad definition of
terrorism and what tools may be used to fight it.246
What is more troubling, however, is the establishment of the
coordination standard, released from the campaign finance realm and
free to run amok through other First Amendment doctrine. Although
it may give the appearance of an objective standard, it is really the
result of the government's interest bleeding into the initial
determination of the value of the speech at issue. Speech has less
value because it is "coordinated," but HLP's definition of
coordination is so broad as to encompass a wide range of speech that
is traditionally protected as pure political speech.247
Perhaps what the Court intended to convey is that speech
coordinated with terrorists deserves less protection because the
government's interest in restricting it is greater. 248 That may be the
end result of a two-step analysis--certainly even under a pure speech
test teaching terrorist organizations how to fly an airplane or launder
money could be banned as akin to a criminal act given the likelihood
it will help further terrorist ends.249 Coordination may be a relevant
factor in determining the strength of the government's interest in the
restriction or in evaluating the restriction's fit to that interest. The
original use of coordination as a factor in favor of restricting
campaign contribution demonstrates this. 250  This reading preserves
the "starch" in the standard while still taking into account a
compelling government interest. But that is not the rationale the HLP
Court used. Instead it took pains to take "coordinated speech" outside
normative justification for the restrictions, such as the HYPO Act discussed herein, which at a
gut level feels like government overreaching.
246. For example, the HYPO Act discussed herein meets all three prerequisites for
restrictions of speech, yet as discussed above allows broad restrictions on the expression of
deeply meaningful moral convictions and political beliefs based on an attenuated connection to
terrorism.
247. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
248. See Margulies, supra note 27, at 486 (arguing government has interest in regulating
agency relationship between organizations and FTOs to prevent FTOs from exploiting
asymmetries in information).
249. Humanitanan Law Projec 130 S. Ct. at 2741-42 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing
that providing training that is of material use in the furtherance of terrorist ends, such as
aviation expertise, may be banned).
250. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
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the realm of "pure political speech" and into a nebulous space with a
largely undefined standard that already has a heavy thumb on the
scales against its protection.
Because nearly all speech is coordinated in some way, the Court
may use this new standard to pick and choose when coordination
triggers a lower level of protection based on the identities of those
speaking. This leaves open the very real possibility that the
coordination standard can be used to selectively restrict speech with
dissident organizations. The Court has a rocky history when it comes
to the protection of speech made in connection with groups seen as a
threat to national security.25 1 While the imminent danger test
overturned the most egregious cases of criminalizing association with
dissident groups, the coordination standard may be poised to revisit
those mistakes in this new war on terror.252
The victory of the coordination standard in Citizens Unitedalso
raises important, but more subtle, issues regarding election spending
as speech. The shift in focus from the nature of the different types of
spending (symbolic or pure speech) toward a strong emphasis on the
coordinated or independent character of the speech greatly limits the
government's ability to address the ever increasing amounts of money
being pumped into electoral contests.5 Inherent in the idea that
independent speech is unassailable is the notion that quid pro quo
corruption is the only legitimate government interest. By defining
independent speech as immune to "real" corruption (i.e. quid pro quo
corruption), the Court essentially forecloses any other government
interest in favor of expenditure restrictions. Perhaps proponents of
campaign finance would do well to take the Court at its word and
focus on enforcing existing regulations and enacting new laws that
directly restrict the way candidates may interact with PACs,
corporations, unions and other "independent" supporters. If
coordination is the true danger, then Congress and the states should be
free to limit cross staffing between candidates and PACs, meetings
between campaigns and "independent" fundraisers and the like.
251. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (discussing early cases allowing
broad restrictions on speech and association in coordination with radical labor unions and the
Communist party).
252. See Rhodes, supra note 16, at 68 (noting that it is conceivable that the purpose of
the Roberts Court in "continually crafting narrow rules, each of which individually appears
moderate" is that "the Court might eventually be able to construct an entirely new
constitutional architecture").
253. See supra note 124 (discussing campaign spending in 2012 election).
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CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether Congress can find a way around Citizens
United, the problems with the coordination standard remain. An
optimist might hope that the standard will remain within the confines
of the two opinions, and perhaps it will. Whatever its future, the
coordination standard provides a compelling reminder to courts to
refrain from injecting normative judgments about the government's
interest into the standard of review.
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